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A REVOLUTIONARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN
STATEHOOD
Craig Green*
Where did states come from? Almost everyone thinks that states descended
immediately, originally, and directly from British colonies, while only after-
ward joining together as the United States. As a matter of legal history, that
is incorrect. States and the United States were created by revolutionary inde-
pendence, and they developed simultaneously in that context as improvised
entities that were profoundly interdependent and mutually constitutive, ra-
ther than separate or sequential.
“States-first” histories have provided foundational support for past and pre-
sent arguments favoring states’ rights and state sovereignty. This Article
gathers preconstitutional evidence about state constitutions, American inde-
pendence, and territorial boundaries to challenge that historical premise. The
Article also chronicles how states-first histories became a dominant cultural
narrative, emerging from factually misleading political debates during the
Constitution’s ratification.
Accurate history matters. Dispelling myths about American statehood can
change how modern lawyers think about federalism and constitutional law.
This Article’s research weakens current support for “New Federalism” juris-
prudence, associates states-rights arguments with periods of conspicuous rac-
ism, and exposes statehood’s functionality as an issue for political actors
instead of constitutional adjudication. Flawed histories of statehood have
been used for many doctrinal, political, and institutional purposes in the
past. This Article hopes that modern readers might find their own use for ac-
curate histories of statehood in the future.
* James E. Beasley Professor of Law, Temple University. Ph.D., Princeton University;
J.D., Yale Law School. Many thanks for comments on earlier drafts by Jane Baron, Mary Sarah
Bilder, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Travis Crum, Tara Leigh Grove, John Harrison, Dirk Hartog,
Dan Hulsebosch, Gillian Metzger, Andrea Monroe, Richard Primus, Rachel Rebouché, Neil
Siegel, Jane Manners, and participants at the Rehnquist Center’s National Conference of Con-
stitutional Law Scholars. Thanks also to Jen Berger, Kevin Craig, John Dikmak, Owen Healy,
Nick Kato, Alisha Kinlaw, Linda Levinson, Brian Mahoney, and Vanessa Milan for outstanding
research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
“Nations reel and stagger on their way; . . . they commit frightful wrongs; they
do great and beautiful things. And shall we not best guide humanity by telling
the truth about all this, so far as the truth is ascertainable?”
—W.E.B. Du Bois1
This Article starts with a fundamental question in legal history: where
did states originally come from?2 Two responses have been widely circulated,
1. W.E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION: AN ESSAY TOWARD A
HISTORY OF THE PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1860–1880, at 714 (1935). Du Bois rejected historical theories from
his era that simplified and distorted the recreation of American statehood and government
after the Civil War. The political stakes of truth telling with respect to eighteenth-century
statehood might be less urgent, yet Du Bois’s willingness to challenge intellectual orthodoxy
has inspired many kinds of history, including this Article. See also JILL LEPORE, THIS AMERICA:
THE CASE FOR THE NATION 10 (2019).
2. Two related questions will also need attention: What does the word “state” mean,
and what time period should be used in describing where states “came from”? See infra Parts I,
II.
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and even though one of them is very popular, both are dramatically flawed.
The popular “states-first” answer is that states historically preceded all forms
of interstate government. Thirteen British colonies reopened as thirteen
American states under “New Management” signs, and those entities fit to-
gether like colored pieces of a map-shaped puzzle.3 Historians, lawyers, and
schoolchildren rely on states-first histories whenever they say that “states
came together” to form the United States.4 According to standard historical
narratives, states emerged first—as the essential and primary entities of
American law and territory—while the United States arrived later as a deriv-
ative project.
The unpopular “union-first” answer is that statehood was secondary be-
cause the legal category itself was conceived and implemented through inter-
state government.5 Abraham Lincoln proclaimed that “[t]he Union is older
than any of the States; and, in fact, it created them as States. Originally, some
dependent colonies made the Union; and, in turn, the Union threw off their
old dependence . . . and made them States, such as they are.”6 A generation
earlier, Andrew Jackson roared that “[t]he unity of our political character . . .
commenced with its very existence.”7 The United States predated its compo-
3. Eighteenth-century maps looked very different from modern puzzles. See, e.g.,
CARINGTON BOWLES, BOWLES’S NEW POCKET MAP OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; THE
BRITISH POSSESSIONS OF CANADA, NOVA SCOTIA, AND NEWFOUNDLAND, WITH FRENCH AND
SPANISH TERRITORIES OF LOUISIANA AND FLORIDA, AS SETTLED BY THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES
OF PEACE SIGNED AT VERSAILLES THE 20TH. OF JANY. 1783 (1784),
https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3700.ar074500/ [https://perma.cc/C568-EF2B]. See also DANIEL
IMMERWAHR, HOW TO HIDE AN EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF THE GREATER UNITED STATES 7–12,
74–75, 221–23, 343–44 (2019). For efforts to trivialize the eighteenth-century transition from
colonies to states, see Thomas Jefferson, The Article on the United States in the Encyclopédie
Méthodique (Jan. 24, 1786), reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3, 11–12 (Jul-
ian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1954), and ALLAN NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER
THE REVOLUTION, 1775-1789, at 1 (1924).
4. Gordon S. Wood, Federalism from the Bottom Up, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 705, 724 (2011)
(book review) (stating that, under the Articles of Confederation, “[t]hirteen independent and
sovereign states came together to form a treaty”); see also, e.g., DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, PEACE
PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (Wilson Carey McWilliams & Lance
Banning eds., 2003); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 14 (2016); PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE
DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 17 (2010); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 163 (1996); Akhil Reed Amar, The
David C. Baum Lecture: Abraham Lincoln and the American Union, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1109,
1124.
5. An even less popular alternative was once sketched by WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE
FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE
CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 1980).
For criticism of Adams, see Jack N. Rakove, Book Review, 38 WM. & MARY Q. 297, 297–301
(1981).
6. Abraham Lincoln, Special Session Address (July 4, 1861), reprinted in 4 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 433–35 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
7. Proclamation No. 26, Respecting the Nullifying Laws of South Carolina (Dec. 10,
1832), reprinted in 11 Stat. 771, 777 (1859).
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nent parts because “[u]nder the royal government we had no separate char-
acter; our opposition to its oppressions began as United Colonies. We were
the United States under the confederation, and the name was perpetuat-
ed . . . . In none of these stages did we consider ourselves in any other light
than as forming one nation.”8
One eighteenth-century eyewitness, James Wilson, ridiculed any histori-
cal argument that states were independent of interstate government: “It is
objected . . . that under [the Constitution] there is no sovereignty left in the
state governments. . . . but I should be very glad to know at what period the
state governments became possessed of the supreme power.”9 Wilson presci-
ently warned that, when Americans do not understand the true history of
statehood, discussions collapse into “a mere illusion of names. We talk of
states, till we forget what they are composed of.”10 Even though prominent
historical figures like Lincoln, Jackson, and Wilson all argued that the United
States came first—with states emerging afterward as legal subordinates—
almost no one believes that today.11
This Article rejects both theories, which have been endlessly repeated in
American politics and law. Advocates have used states-first and union-first
histories to debate the Alien and Sedition Act in the eighteenth century, state
nullification of nineteenth-century tariffs, secession during the Civil War,
and twentieth-century resistance to racial desegregation.12 Supreme Court
8. Id.
9. Remarks of James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the Constitu-
tion of the United States, 1787, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 258 (Dec. 11, 1787)
(Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007) (emphasis added); see id. at 201 (Dec. 1, 1787);
Remarks by James Wilson at the Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Dec. 1, 1787), in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE
GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 443 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia,
J.B. Lippincott Co. reprt. 2d ed. 1937) (1836) [hereinafter STATE CONVENTIONS (1836)].
10. Remarks by James Wilson at the Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsyl-
vania on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 30, 1787), in 5 DEBATES ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA, IN
1787; WITH A DIARY OF THE DEBATES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION 261, 262
(Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1845) [hereinafter STATE CONVENTIONS
(1845)] (emphasis added).
11. See Amar, supra note 4, at 1124 (rejecting Lincoln’s approach). But see Richard B.
Morris, The Forging of the Union Reconsidered: A Historical Refutation of State Sovereignty over
Seabeds, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1056, 1056, 1089 (1974) (arguing incorrectly that states were “a
creation of the Continental Congress, which preceded them in time and brought them into
being”); GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE,
at ix (1978) (adopting Morris’s thesis after once having denied it).
12. For states-first arguments against the Alien and Sedition Act, see Thomas Jefferson,
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, reprinted in 4 STATE CONVENTIONS (1836), supra note
9, at 540–44. For states-first arguments that favor tariff nullification, see South Carolina, Ordi-
nance to Nullify an Act of the Congress of the United States, entitled “An Act Further to Pro-
vide for the Collection of Duties on Imports,” Commonly Called the Force Bill (Mar. 18, 1833),
reprinted in JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 129–30 (Co-
lumbia, S.C., R.W. Gibbes 1833), and 9 REG. DEB. 364 (1833).
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cases have cited states-first history to support slavery under Dred Scott,
modern doctrines of “freestanding federalism,” and many other legal re-
sults.13 In 2019, the Supreme Court declared that “[a]fter independence, the
States considered themselves fully sovereign nations,” and it concluded that
For secession and the Civil War, see DECLARATION OF THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES WHICH
INDUCE AND JUSTIFY THE SECESSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA FROM THE FEDERAL UNION (1860),
reprinted in JOHN AMASA MAY & JOAN REYNOLDS FAUNT, SOUTH CAROLINA SECEDES 76, 76–
81 (1960), and 1 ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE WAR
BETWEEN THE STATES 370 (Philadelphia, Nat’l Publ’g Co. 1868).
For twentieth-century racial segregation, see JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE
SOVEREIGN STATES: NOTES OF A CITIZEN OF VIRGINIA 258–63 (1957). Other prominent appli-
cations of states-first history include Franklin Pierce, Veto Message on Legislation Funding
Public Works (Aug. 4, 1854), in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 2789, 2789–90 (James D. Richardson ed., New York, Bureau of Nat’l Literature
1897), and Letter from Sec’y of State Thomas Jefferson to President George Washington (Mar.
18, 1792), http://jeffersonswest.unl.edu/archive/view_doc.php?id=jef.00105 [https://perma.cc
/S4WN-U86M].
As we have seen, Lincoln and Jackson advanced union-first histories in their opposition
to nullification and secession. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. Lincoln further
claimed that “[o]ur States have neither more, nor less power, than that reserved to them, in the
Union, by the Constitution—no one of them ever having been a State out of the Union.”
LINCOLN, supra note 6, at 433. If Lincoln’s theory were deemed legally acceptable, then all
originalist analysis of statehood should focus exclusively on the late 1780s, regardless of earlier
historical evidence about independence and confederation. See Part III (describing unresolved
debates over statehood during the 1780s). For an exaggerated vision of preconstitutional unity
after Lincoln’s death, see Charles Sumner, Address Before the New York Men’s Republican
Union: Are We a Nation? 11 (Nov. 19, 1867) (transcript on file with the Michigan Law Re-
view).
13. For academic discussion of “freestanding federalism,” see infra Section IV.A; John F.
Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 2003 (2009); Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy of Freestanding Federalism,
122 HARV. L. REV. F. 98 (2009); see also Craig Green, Erie and Problems of Constitutional Struc-
ture, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 661 (2008); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 731 (2010).
For sixteen examples when the Supreme Court has invoked states-first history, see Feder-
al Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743, 752 (2002);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–19 (1997); United States Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 802–03 (1995) (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 9 (1964));
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S.
775, 779 (1991); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1890); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
700, 725 (1868), overruled in part by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885); Jackson v.
The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 323 (1857) (Campbell, J., dissenting); Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 434 (1857); Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 504, 587 (1847), overruled in part by Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890); Martin v. Les-
see of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 657, 693 (1838); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 192–93 (1819); and
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 224 (1796) (Chase, J.). See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238, 295–96 (1936). The Supreme Court has issued very few examples of “union-first”
history. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936). Only one
Supreme Court opinion points toward a third possibility that has the benefit of being, perhaps
inadvertently, historically accurate. See Lane Cnty. v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868)
(“Both the States and the United States existed before the Constitution.”).
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therefore “the States retain their sovereign immunity” up to the present.14
Using states-first history to overturn a forty-year-old precedent, the Court
confirmed that the legal status of eighteenth-century statehood remains im-
portant today—at least in some contexts and for some audiences.15
Despite widespread disputes, no one has written an adequate history of
legal statehood.16 The American public has ignored basic questions about
how and when statehood developed, perhaps assuming that states arrived
along with sailors’ luggage or developed through some kind of natural evolu-
tion. Most scholars have likewise presumed that the status of American
states was essentially constant from 1776 to 1788, thereby drawing artificially
straight lines from colonial status to constitutional statehood.17 Civics-class
mythology has obscured the historical meaning of eighteenth-century state-
hood, and it has also distorted efforts to understand how states became what
they are today.
To begin with obvious errors, it was impossible for thirteen British colo-
nies to become thirteen American states because only twelve colonies joined
the Revolution. The thirteenth state, called by its new name “Delaware,”
spent nearly a century as the “Lower Counties” of Pennsylvania, and colo-
nists in that region claimed independence from William Penn and Britain at
precisely the same time. Some readers will be shocked to hear that there nev-
er was a British colony “Delaware.”18 But the analytical point runs much
deeper than any simple factual correction. Every popular history of state-
hood appears more supportable if one assumes that there were thirteen col-
onies, and so do conventional histories of Delaware and triumphal myths
14. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1493, 1498 (2019). An earlier opin-
ion from Justice Breyer contradicted the approach in Hyatt, despite Breyer’s own casualness
about underlying historical facts. “The original 13 States, once dependents of Britain, became
independent entities perhaps at the time of the Declaration of Independence [1776], perhaps at
the signing of the Treaty of Paris [1783], perhaps with the creation of the Articles of Confeder-
ation [1781]. (I need not be precise.)” Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1878
(2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. at 1493, 1499 (overturning Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)).
16. Peter Onuf’s attention to the historical construction of statehood is a partial coun-
terexample, but his conclusions remain deeply affected by states-first assumptions. See PETER S.
ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1775–1787 (1983); Peter S. Onuf, State-Making in Revolutionary America: In-
dependent Vermont as a Case Study, 67 J. AM. HIST. 797 (1981); see also PETER S. ONUF,
STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE (1987); PETER S. ONUF,
JEFFERSON’S EMPIRE: THE LANGUAGE OF AMERICAN NATIONHOOD (2000). By contrast, analy-
sis by German scholar Willi Paul Adams offers a useful complement or corrective to existing
historical narratives. See ADAMS, supra note 5.
17. See, e.g., NEVINS, supra note 3, at 1.
18. One could collect thousands of inaccurate references to “thirteen” rebellious British
colonies. Every generation of citizens, lawyers, and scholars has accepted that number as the
unquestioned truth. E.g., ROBERT J. ALLISON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A VERY SHORT
INTRODUCTION 4, 19 (2015).
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about the Constitution.19 This Article suggests that dominant narratives
about statehood have repeatedly ignored awkward details. Correcting histor-
ical narratives is one step toward fixing constitutional law. With respect to
American statehood, inattention to Delaware dramatically illustrates how far
there is to go.
Twelve other revolutionary states used prerevolutionary colonial names,
which verbally announced new entities’ existence and the old regime’s anni-
hilation.20 The act of claiming those names was politically important, yet the
new states “Virginia” and “New York” were legally different from the colo-
nies that came before. The Revolution altered legal definitions of state citi-
zenries, officials, and institutions, while also transforming boundaries that
defined the states themselves.21 For centuries, British imperial law created
and sustained colonies as territorial entities. The renunciation of British law
produced a new category of “statehood” that reflected an aspirationally
emerging legal order.
Prerevolutionary colonies were supposed to be formally subservient,
malleable, and derivative creations of the British Empire.22 American states
had different objectives—a major impetus for the Revolution—and no state
acted alone in creating or pursuing its augmented legal status. States did not
rise onto naturally independent feet. Nor did interstate negotiations resem-
19. E.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 247 (2005)
(claiming that Delaware was omitted from a 1776 version of Benjamin Franklin’s snake car-
toon “Join, or Die” because Franklin came from Pennsylvania). In fact, Benjamin Franklin was
quite familiar with the Lower Counties’ status as a semiautonomous entity inside Pennsylvania,
having published the first copy of the Laws of the Government of New Castle, Kent, and Sussex
[Counties] upon Delaware in 1741, and having also printed currency for the Lower Counties’
government. See THE EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS OF DELAWARE 1704–1741, at 12 (John D. Cush-
ing ed., 1978); BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 125
(Leonard W. Labaree et al. eds., 2d ed. 1964). For orthodox Delawarean history, see JOHN A.
MUNROE, HISTORY OF DELAWARE 63 (5th ed. 2006) [hereinafter MUNROE, HISTORY OF
DELAWARE], and JOHN A. MUNROE, COLONIAL DELAWARE: A HISTORY 217–34 (Delaware
Heritage Press 2003) (1978) [hereinafter MUNROE, COLONIAL DELAWARE]. Perhaps Amar de-
serves credit as one of the only law professors to notice anything at all odd about Delaware
during the revolutionary period.
20. Similar tactics about governmental names appear among modern postrevolutionary
governments as well. See 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON
WITH FORMER REGIMES, at xv–xvi (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
21. See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Revolutionary Portfolio: Constitution-Making and the
Wider World in the American Revolution, 47 SUFFOLK L. REV. 759, 776 (2014) (“[E]ach state
prosecuted native-born or long-domiciled residents who remained loyal to the Empire as trai-
tors. Treason prosecutions, by judicial verdict and statutory attainder, also became an im-
portant source of revenue for the states.”); Alan Taylor, Expand or Die: The Revolution’s New
Empire, 74 WM. & MARY Q. 619, 630 (2017) (“We often overlook the enhancement of state
power because of our preoccupation with a national story focused on the federal Union.”).
22. Colonial experience did not always follow such a rigid hierarchy in practice. See
JACK P. GREENE, THE QUEST FOR POWER: THE LOWER HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY IN THE SOUTHERN
ROYAL COLONIES 1689-1776, at 3–4 (1963).
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ble international diplomacy where background norms about negotiators’ le-
gal status and territorial existence were taken for granted.23
On the contrary, legal characteristics of American states and statehood
were created and negotiated in the same historical moments as the United
States’ central government, often through the same legal documents. States
and the United States repeatedly leaned on one another for support and
recognition, operating and functioning together, of necessity and also by de-
sign. Both layers of government jointly manufactured structures to organize
populations and territory even as they struggled with one another over par-
ticular substantive points. American law borrowed heavily from British ex-
perience in other regards,24 but establishing the status of states and their
relationship to central government would require substantial innovation and
improvisation.
American statehood was never determined by abstract theory, nor was it
produced by facile imitation. To ask which came first as a historical matter—
the states or the United States—yields a paradox of chickens and eggs that is
widely overlooked. Exploring that paradox raises deeper questions about
23. Dan Hulsebosch and David Golove have shown that diplomacy and the law of na-
tions were essential components of eighteenth-century statehood, as they also were essential to
the United States’ emergent nationhood. See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civi-
lized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of Interna-
tional Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 935, 980 (2010) (describing “The International
Constitution”); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Being Seen Like a State: How Americans (and Britons)
Built the Constitutional Infrastructure of a Developing Nation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1239,
1242–46 (2018) (adding international commerce and credit to analysis of governmental struc-
tures); Hulsebosch, supra note 21, at 769 (“[R]evolutionary institution-building was performed
on an international stage.”); see also ELIGA H. GOULD, AMONG THE POWERS OF THE EARTH:
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE MAKING OF A NEW WORLD EMPIRE (2012) (describing
the United States’ emphasis on international reputation). Although such works have some-
times analogized early statehood to an international treaty among sovereign European gov-
ernments, they also acknowledge that “the political relationships among the states and between
each state and the Congress were left unmapped,” Golove & Hulsebosch, supra at 951, which
illustrates a fundamental difference between American statehood and most examples from Eu-
ropean history. See DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664–1830, at 189
(2005) (“Throughout the war, the relationship between the state and the Continental Congress,
and then Confederation government, was unclear.”); Hulsebosch, supra note 21, at 774 (“There
was . . . no internationally prescribed mode for gaining recognition as an independent state.”);
cf. HULSEBOSCH, supra at 170 (“We have a government, you know, to form; and God only
knows what it will resemble.” (quoting a letter from John Jay on July 6, 1776)).
Other research has shown that negotiations with and violence against Native Americans
are frequently overlooked aspects of revolutionary and constitutional statehood. Gregory
Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 999 (2014); Craig Green, Creating Amer-
ican Boundaries: Federalism and Dispossession (unpublished manuscript) (on file with au-
thor). Even though this Article will focus on the development of legal materials by white North
Americans, no one should assume that such episodes were ever fully isolated from European
and Native American forms of power, law, or influence.
24. See 1 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE
CHESAPEAKE AND NEW ENGLAND, 1607–1660 (2008); 2 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON
LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE MIDDLE COLONIES AND THE CAROLINAS, 1660–1730 (2013).
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what statehood originally meant and how states developed in the centuries
that followed. This Article analyzes in detail the former issue of origins,
while highlighting later historical developments as an important topic for
future research.25
American states were not easily derived from British colonies, just as the
United States did not simply recreate the British Empire. Hundreds of books
have analyzed how the national United States displaced British North Amer-
ica, yet almost no scholarship has considered how states displaced colonies.26
To understand statehood as a legal category requires new interpretations of
the Revolution and the Constitution. It also raises questions about history’s
practical significance when modern courts interpret and apply constitutional
law.
This Article proceeds in four steps. Part I explains what it means to
study states and statehood as objects of legal history. Comparable to “cities,”
“colonies,” “corporations,” and “nations,” states and statehood are technical
legal entities that only sometimes overlap with nonlegal experience.27 A few
scholars have analyzed states as economic, social, intellectual, or cultural en-
tities, and their research has focused on economic, social, intellectual, and
25. See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE INTERBELLUM CONSTITUTION: UNION, COMMERCE,
AND SLAVERY FROM THE LONG FOUNDING MOMENT TO THE CIVIL WAR (forthcoming 2020);
Maeve Glass, Founding Properties (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
26. E.g., JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (2011). This Article’s history of statehood is distinct from abundant histories of
federalism, though it obviously borrows from that literature. Histories of federalism typically
cover different subjects and use different source materials that bypass the origins of states,
while shifting attention toward the integration, separation, and interrelationship of such enti-
ties relative to the United States. Compare ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2011), and DAVID BRIAN ROBERTSON, FEDERALISM AND THE MAKING
OF AMERICA (2d ed. 2018), with infra Part I.
27. For example, one could define a “city” based on particular standards for high-
density residence, aggregations of urban infrastructure, or cultural features like television
channels and sports teams. See JEAN GOTTMANN, MEGALOPOLIS: THE URBANIZED
NORTHEASTERN SEABOARD OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (1961) (defining a New York-centered
urban area based on sociological concentrations of population, “banking, insurance, wholesale,
entertainment and transportation activities”). From a strictly legal perspective, however, cities
are formal entities that possess technically prescribed borders, governments, origins, powers,
and responsibilities. HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE
CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730–1870, at 2 (Cornell Univ.
Press 1989) (1983). One could similarly use the word “corporation” to describe almost any
powerful aggregation of wealth or personnel—as in “corporate America”—or the term could
be reserved for a specific kind of legally chartered entity with prescribed legal powers and a
technical residence. Cf. James Wilson, Address to the People of Philadelphia, Speech Delivered
at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Oct. 6, 1787), https://oll.libertyfund.org
/pages/1787-wilson-address-to-the-people-of-philadelphia-speech [https://perma.cc/98YU-
3SSV] (“In common parlance, indeed, [the word ‘corporation’] is generally applied to petty
associations for the ease and conveniency of a few individuals; but in its enlarged sense, it will
comprehend the government of Pennsylvania, the existing union of the states, and even [the
proposed Constitution] . . . .”).
10 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:1
cultural materials.28 By contrast, this Article offers an “unapologetically” le-
gal history of statehood, which is tightly focused on legal documents and ne-
gotiations without addressing broader relationships to economic practice,
social reality, intellectual theory, or cultural characterization.29 Such legally
oriented analysis cannot be the last word on the history of states and state-
hood, but perhaps it will provide a useful step forward.
Part II presents three kinds of evidence from 1775 to 1788 about the ori-
gins and nature of statehood. One category involves the first American con-
stitutions, which effectively inaugurated provincial government outside of
British authority. From their earliest existence, breakaway colonies-and-
states were not manufacturing constitutions in their capacity as self-
authorized sovereignties, standing alone and boldly announcing their exist-
ence. On the contrary, provincial constitutional systems were requested by,
coordinated with, and validated through the Continental Congress as an as-
pirationally central government.
A second category of evidence surrounds declarations of independence
that rejected British authority to formally produce anticolonial statehood.
Revolutionary colonies and states asserted legal independence from Britain
through highly interdependent mechanisms, analogous to state and central
cooperation in the contemporaneous war that they were trying to survive.
There was never any historical moment when states could have preceded the
United States because both layers of government were interrelated in their
joint and codependent legal struggles for existence. From the beginning,
states and the United States had to function together, and their developing
legal status reflected that interlocking set of needs.
The third category involves states as territorial entities with geograph-
ically specific borders, authorities, and responsibilities. Renouncing British
imperial government implied that states and central governments had to de-
cide for themselves—and alongside one another—how territorial claims
could be asserted and challenged. Legal borders defined where states were
located, and those decisions determined states’ economic and demographic
future, while also establishing a framework for states to exist and coexist.
All of these eighteenth-century materials indicate that states were very
different from colonies. They were also different from international coun-
tries like France, as well as existing confederacies like the Netherlands or the
Iroquois (Haudenosaunee). Revolutionary states were never independent
from one another, much less were they autonomous from the interstate gov-
ernments that they helped to inaugurate. American “States” were always
28. Some of the best scholarship in this group has described economic, social, intellec-
tual, and cultural forces that transcend or challenge the limits of statehood and nationhood. See
CONTESTED SPACES OF EARLY AMERICA (Juliana Barr & Edward Countryman eds., 2014);
MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND
THE EMPIRE (2004); CHARLES S. MAIER, ONCE WITHIN BORDERS: TERRITORIES OF POWER,
WEALTH, AND BELONGING SINCE 1500 (2016).
29. HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 2 (2000) (describing
the potential importance of focused legal history, despite its clear imperfections).
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“United,” and those words were repeatedly contested and constructed in the
same historical episodes.
As an ancillary project, Part III examines the origins of inaccurate myths
about preconstitutional states and statehood. States-first and union-first ar-
guments have served diverse political purposes throughout United States
history, including the Constitution’s framing and ratification. This Article’s
thesis is that such theories were always developed and contested, rather than
timeless, original, or conventional. During eighteenth-century ratification
debates, for example, Federalists and Anti-Federalists disagreed about the
Constitution’s substantive merit. Yet both sides circulated broken histories
of the Articles of Confederation, characterizing states as primary, essential,
and sovereign in contrast to the weak and derivative central government. Af-
ter ratification, similarly distorted images of preconstitutional state-centrism
were even more prominent. Modern intellectuals and lawyers cannot hope
to escape this flawed consensus unless they look beyond Federalist and Anti-
Federalist pamphlets. Reliance on that deeply political literature explains
many Americans’ orthodox misimpression that somehow—in the begin-
ning—there were states.
Part IV briefly considers possible normative implications. Supreme
Court decisions espousing “freestanding federalism” have relied on abstract
intuitions about eighteenth-century history without attention to factual de-
tails. Although this Article will not address specific doctrinal questions, it re-
jects any assumption that constitutional statehood was a primordial fact or
an eighteenth-century consensus. States did not enter the union fully formed
of their own volition. Under such circumstances, states could not legally rely
on implicit assumptions about their new constitutional status—they had to
depend on postratification politics. In the late eighteenth century, statehood
was not a background convention that simply went without saying. It was a
contested legal category that changed several times, with some aspects ex-
plicitly resolved, and many questions persistently unanswered.
As with the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confedera-
tion, the Constitution did not simply diminish states by making them com-
promise preexisting status and authority; it also established state powers that
were previously lacking. Contrary to popular myths, states did not give up
one fraction of their natural sovereignty to silently preserve the rest. Instead,
the Constitution composed and reformed statehood itself as a legal category,
revising and borrowing from earlier models, clarifying some issues while
leaving others undecided. Most modern doctrines that affirm and establish
states’ rights cannot be credibly planted in the shifting sands of eighteenth-
century statehood. Right or wrong, today’s states-rights advocates must seek
constitutional support from other historical periods and materials.
Historical mistakes have allowed modern conventions about states’
rights to slip backward in time, from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
toward an undifferentiated period of 1776 to 1788. There were plenty of
states-rights arguments during ratification, and those positions gained more
power as the United States’ economic and legal systems developed. The
problem is that rewritten timelines can help states-rights advocates to insu-
12 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:1
late arguments about constitutional statehood from the politics of later peri-
ods, including massive plantation slavery and Jim Crow racism. This Article
challenges a phenomenon that could be called “Founders-Chic Federalism”
in order to clarify the specific history of states-rights doctrines, while also
inviting closer attention to the use of historical arguments elsewhere in con-
stitutional law.30
Enthusiasm for historical accuracy depends on a broad legal audience
more than any particular author.31 This Article may convince some readers
that constitutional law demands more careful and accurate historical analy-
sis. Other readers might think that constitutional law should make fewer
substantive claims based on casual historical characterizations. Insofar as
modern federalism doctrine is serious about eighteenth-century history, the
consequences of this Article’s revisionism are substantial and obvious. By
contrast, if modern uses of eighteenth-century history are simply ornamen-
tal, lawyers must acknowledge that constitutional statehood has changed
over the years, despite prevalent rhetoric about timeless consistency. Under
either scenario—historical instability in the eighteenth century or doctrinal
instability afterward—this Article proposes that most issues concerning
statehood should be presumptively decided by modern political instruments
instead of constitutional adjudication. The latter institutional mechanisms
rely too often on unfortunate mixtures of flawed eighteenth-century history
and misplaced twenty-first-century functionalism. Some aspects of state-
hood were constitutionally specified, including the Electoral College, alloca-
tion of Senate seats, and territorial boundaries. Yet most details remain open
for political debate and disposition, as was also true in the beginning.
I. ANALYZING STATES AS LEGAL ENTITIES
The time period between the Revolution and the Constitution is one of
the most widely studied in United States history, yet almost no one has ana-
lyzed eighteenth-century states as legal entities. This Part briefly explains this
Article’s relationship to two general categories of existing scholarship. The
first category tends to highlight national development of the United States
and constitutional federalism without analyzing the revolutionary origins,
contours, and composition of statehood.32 Such nationalist scholarship of
30. See Francis D. Cogliano, Founders Chic, 90 HISTORY 411, 412 n.2 (2005) (book re-
view); David Waldstreicher, Founders Chic as Culture War, 84 RADICAL HIST. REV. 185 (2002).
For one especially sophisticated example of “Founders Chic” scholarship, see JOSEPH J. ELLIS,
AMERICAN DIALOGUE: THE FOUNDERS AND US 7–9 (2018) (“Given our current condition as a
deeply divided people, my hope is that the founding era can become a safe space to gather to-
gether, not so much to find answers to . . . questions as to argue about them.”); id. at 223–24
(“Soon after their departure, a thick cloud of incense formed around the founders . . . . The
founders desperately wanted to be remembered. But they must not be canonized.”).
31. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (quoting W.E.B. Du Bois concerning the
“Propaganda of History”).
32. See AMAR, supra note 19, at 122; KLARMAN, supra note 4, at 5; GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 355–56 (1969).
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federalism centers on the allocation of powers to central governments as
though states already existed as fully formed elements of the constitutional
system.33 Many political theorists have produced blueprints about American
nationhood and federalism that portray states as mostly inert or unexamined
entities until the ratification debates.34 There are many histories that involve
states without providing histories of statehood. Even as the legal shift from
Britain to America has received extraordinary attention, the legal shift from
colony to state has not had nearly enough.
A second set of research has considered individual states in isolation,
typically beginning with European ships and colonial charters long before
states or statehood were even imagined.35 Law is rarely central to these pro-
vincial histories, and the law of statehood never is.36 On the contrary, the
point is to describe an imaginary or essential entity whose history transcends
formal categories of colonies or statehood. Provincial histories often describe
cultural, religious, economic, and social dynamics in order to understand
how particular groups of people gathered and organized themselves in places
called “Virginia” or “Massachusetts.”37 Less attention is paid to a state’s peers
in different locations, and very little is given to the legal category that defined
the peership itself. Provincial histories often culminate in stories about the
United States, thus resembling the first category of nationalist scholarship.38
In other respects, however, most research about particular states could just
as easily describe British Quebec, New Spain, and East or West Florida,
which never became individual states at all.39 For current purposes, such
33. See GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, WE HAVE NOT A GOVERNMENT: THE ARTICLES
OF CONFEDERATION AND THE ROAD TO THE CONSTITUTION 3–7 (2017).
34. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
25–32, 324–37 (enlarged ed. 1992); MAIER, supra note 4, at 126.
35. See, e.g., JERE R. DANIELL, COLONIAL NEW HAMPSHIRE: A HISTORY 14–22 (Univ.
Press of New Eng. 2015) (1981); MUNROE, COLONIAL DELAWARE, supra note 19, at 15; PETER
WALLENSTEIN, CRADLE OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF VIRGINIA 1–5 (2d rev. ed. 2014).
36. Cf. HOWARD PASHMAN, BUILDING A REVOLUTIONARY STATE: THE LEGAL
TRANSFORMATION OF NEW YORK, 1776–1783, at 20–21 (2018) (discussing the transformation
of private law alongside revolutionary politics, without directly analyzing statehood as a legal
category).
37. See, e.g., MARSHA L. HAMILTON, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NETWORKS IN EARLY
MASSACHUSETTS: ATLANTIC CONNECTIONS 8–15 (2009).
38. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
39. Similar historical treatment is common for territorial governments outside the
United States. For example, James Kennedy’s analysis of the Netherlands explicitly considers
“historical developments within the territory that at present constitutes the Kingdom of the
Netherlands.” JAMES C. KENNEDY, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE NETHERLANDS 3 (2017). The
first chapter starts 15,000 years ago with groups whose lived experiences had no connection to
modern ideas about “the Netherlands” as such. See id. at 10–11. The point is not to criticize
Kennedy’s approach—much less provincial scholarship concerning individual states—but ra-
ther to identify potentially variable starting points for any history of the Netherlands, Virginia,
or the United States. With the land or first residents, with any self-identified polity, or with the
first government to use the modern name? This Article will focus exclusively on legal history,
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provincial histories often include descriptions of particular states without
exploring the category of statehood.
This Article highlights states and statehood by identifying when and
how states came into being, separate and apart from colonial entities that—
aside from Delaware—operated for a long time under the same names. Such
close attention to preconstitutional statehood sets an important baseline for
identifying what states originally meant and how they developed in the revo-
lutionary period. Unlike most scholarship, this Article’s source materials are
not especially ideological—focused on ageless philosophers or theorists—nor
are they especially materialist—focused on allocations of human bodies and
property. Instead, the ambition is to implement a mezzanine-level history of
legal statehood that focuses on how aspirationally legal ideas were expressed
in operative documents and negotiations.40
This Article’s methodology assumes that groups of disgruntled colonists
were tied to one another by something more than unvarnished economics,
religion, and social factors. They were also bound together by law, and those
legal documents were not identical to political propaganda or European in-
tellectualism. This Article emphasizes revolutionary Americans who started
to produce, manage, and serve collective entities that were self-consciously
legal, including a peculiar mixture of American “states” that were “united”
from the start.
Legal statehood deserves attention. Alongside familiar concepts of eight-
eenth-century liberty, equality, republicanism, and nationhood, the revolu-
tionary period was also essentially concerned about “states.” None of the
concepts on that list was a simple legacy from Britain, nor did any of them
acquire singular meanings at specific moments thereafter.41 Just like other
revolutionary ideas, statehood exists dynamically among the fundamental
but certainly that is just one way—with benefits and costs—to analyze such complicated ques-
tions.
40. Attempts to define “law” and “legal” can be especially complex in discussions that
involve historical materials. See 1 G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM THE
COLONIAL YEARS THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR 1–15 (2012); see also Sally Falk Moore, Law and
Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 719, 719–20 (1973); Hendrik Hartog, Snakes in Ireland: A Conversation with
Willard Hurst, 12 LAW & HIST. REV. 370, 377–78 (1994). Instead of offering analytical theories
of what law is today, much less what it was for these historical actors, this Article will narrowly
focus on groups of legal materials that should be easily recognizable as such in the modern era
and would be similarly recognizable to Anglo-Americans in the eighteenth century. Erudite
arguments that all Eurocentric law conceptually derived from Roman history presents a cau-
tionary tale against trying to elaborate similar themes in this Article. See ALDO SCHIAVONE,
THE INVENTION OF LAW IN THE WEST (Jeremy Carden & Antony Shugaar trans., 2012).
41. See ALAN TAYLOR, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS: A CONTINENTAL HISTORY, 1750–
1804, at 1–9 (2016); Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST.
11, 11–38 (1992).
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“keywords, the metaphors, the self-evident truths” of American politics that
matter “too deeply for us to use them in any but contested ways.”42
Statehood is already an implicitly fundamental feature of revolutionary
history. Patriots did not fight simply to lower taxes, and military struggle is
often a counterproductive way to reduce fiscal burdens.43 At one level, colo-
nists were essentially disputing what kinds of legal entities should tax and
govern.44 Eighteenth-century revolutionaries argued that lawmakers and tax
assessments should mostly derive from individual colonies or states, and
sometimes from the United States.45 Even though the British Empire made
substantive governmental errors that the United States hoped to avoid, the
Revolution’s most immediate and lasting guarantees concerned basic struc-
tures of leadership, government, and authority.46 The operative legal entities
after the war were declared to be states instead of colonies, and the United
States instead of Britain. What any of those words meant in practice was up
for grabs, and to understand what happened requires examining precisely
when and how states emerged as legal entities.
II. RIDDLING ABOUT CHICKENS AND EGGS
To explore the historical origins of legal statehood, this Part examines
three sets of preconstitutional materials. First are efforts to create provincial
governments through documents that were eventually called “state constitu-
tions.” These represent the earliest efforts to announce new governmental
structures that sought to establish—perhaps temporarily—states’ existence
beyond British authority. Modern observers have viewed state constitutions
as archetypically local episodes, and that characterization has made such
documents especially important for states-first historians.47 However, every
state constitution—including the first examples in New Hampshire and
South Carolina—emerged through the intimate cooperation and coordina-
tion of local authorities and the aspirationally Continental Congress. Revolu-
tionary Americans established different levels of provincial and central
governments improvisationally, in mutual reliance, and all at once. Neither
states nor the United States could have plausibly claimed historical anteced-
42. DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS
SINCE INDEPENDENCE 16 (1998).
43. See JUSTIN DU RIVAGE, REVOLUTION AGAINST EMPIRE: TAXES, POLITICS, AND THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 5–23 (2017).
44. See James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764), re-
printed in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1750-1776, at 408 (Bernard Bailyn
ed., 1965).
45. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII (“[T]axes . . . shall be laid and levied
by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several States.”).
46. See RIVAGE, supra note 43, at 22.
47. See 2 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 22 (1888) (calling state con-
stitutions “the oldest things in the political history of America”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1437–49 (1987).
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ence based on their legal actions, much less could either have claimed nor-
mative priority. Revolutionary politicians who were bracing for war did not
have time to debate the theoretical chronology of chickens and eggs.
A second category of evidence involves efforts to identify “states” using
that particular noun. Much like colonial status under the British Empire, the
category of legal statehood was not something that happened through unex-
amined accidents. On the contrary, American statehood was claimed and
contested at identifiable moments, including the Declaration of Independ-
ence’s description of the “United States” as “Free and Independent States.”48
The Declaration of Independence itself was a formally collective document
that recognized and created states as legally individual entities. A different
declaration of statehood occurred in the same period, as a small revolution-
ary entity, the Lower Counties (modern Delaware), repudiated legal authori-
ty from Britain and Pennsylvania alike.49 Both the interstate Declaration of
Independence and the Lower Counties’ provincial resolution emerged from
complex legal relationships that represented indissoluble mixtures of state
and interstate authority. Under every circumstance, declarations of legal in-
dependence from Britain created opportunities for debating what American
states were supposed to be, and simultaneously how states were supposed to
be organized inside the United States. Those two dynamics happened at the
same time, with mutual interreliance and functional togetherness among
various levels of government.
A third category of evidence involves states’ scope and existence as terri-
torial entities. Many observers trivialize such issues under the misleading la-
bel “western lands,” but territorial law was more important than that.50 One
of a state’s earliest characteristics was its purported geographic location. Pre-
revolutionary and postrevolutionary states were legally identified by their
connections to land, placing “Virginia” over here and “New York” over
there.51 Before the Revolution, some colonial borders were vague, and their
location seemed purely theoretical with respect to areas that Europeans sel-
dom visited.52
48. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
49. John A. Munroe, Revolution and Confederation, in 1 DELAWARE: A HISTORY OF THE
FIRST STATE 95, 106–07 (H. Clay Reed ed., 1947).
50. See Peter Onuf, Toward Federalism: Virginia, Congress, and the Western Lands, 34
WM. & MARY Q. 353, 353–56 (1977).
51. But cf. JOHN MITCHELL, THOMAS KITCHIN & ANDREW MILLAR, A MAP OF THE
BRITISH AND FRENCH DOMINIONS IN NORTH AMERICA, WITH THE ROADS, DISTANCES, LIMITS,
AND EXTENT OF THE SETTLEMENTS, HUMBLY INSCRIBED TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE
EARL OF HALIFAX, AND THE OTHER RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS FOR
TRADE & PLANTATIONS (1755), https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3300.np000009/ [https://perma
.cc/NRP3-E4TK] (depicting Virginia and New York with the same color and thus inseparably
blending each into one another).
52. See RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS IN
THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650–1815, at xxv–xxxii (20th anniversary ed. 2011) (indicating
how territorial and other intercultural disputes were changed by more solid legal institutions
and more aggressive European migration).
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As a matter of legal status, Britain always possessed formal authority to
create new colonies, create or merge existing ones, or relocate boundaries.53
It was much less clear how postrevolutionary institutions and substantive
law would identify borders or resolve disputes among states. Territorial deci-
sions were vital to determining states’ tax policies and migration patterns,
their political relationship to other states, and even their survival as social
and economic units. During this period, questions about the location of
“Virginia” and “New York” were also connected to territorial construction of
the United States under the Articles and the Constitution. Even as splotches
or lines on a map, the definition of statehood and the formulation of inter-
state nationhood were inextricably linked.
No single element of this eighteenth-century evidence stands alone in
defining American states, and this Article’s explicit goal is to consider differ-
ent ways of identifying statehood’s legal origins. In the aggregate, however,
such evidence suggests that efforts to sequentially order the histories of states
and the United States are flawed. There was no primordial moment when
states came together, nor was there a moment when the United States con-
ceived states out of nothing. As a matter of legal rhetoric and action, differ-
ent categories of revolutionary government claimed and recognized each
other’s authority in exactly the same time period. The states and United
States leaned against one another as co-constitutive entities, and all of this
might seem perfectly obvious, if it were not so widely forgotten and ignored.
A. Constitutions for Colonies, and for States
The earliest state constitutions were not called “state constitutions,” and
establishing “states” is not what they tried to do. During these particular
moments, it was unclear whether statehood, war, or independence would ev-
er come to pass. Nevertheless, such prerevolutionary efforts to organize at
the colonial level helped start the process of statehood, much as the Conti-
nental Congress started the process of interstate government.
The first of these provincial documents came from New Hampshire,
during a period when prerevolutionary strife was affecting colonies in differ-
ent ways.54 Massachusetts residents had thrown tea in Boston Harbor, lead-
ing Parliament to suspend the provincial assembly, increase the royal
governor’s power, and impose harsh legal restrictions.55 By contrast, New
Hampshire’s Governor John Wentworth urged London to “restore the pow-
ers of [royal] Government,” while predicting that his own colony had fortu-
53. See Eliga H. Gould, Zones of Law, Zones of Violence: The Legal Geography of the Brit-
ish Atlantic, Circa 1772, 60 WM. & MARY Q. 471, 475 (2003).
54. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, THE NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE CONSTITUTION, at xvii (2d ed.
2015).
55. GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A HISTORY 37–38 (2002).
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nately “passed the crisis without much mischief.”56 Wentworth spoke too
soon. In late 1774, rioters sacked New Hampshire’s munitions depot, and the
governor was powerless to chastise the thieves.57 Crowds pointed a stolen
cannon at Wentworth’s front door, and the “frantic rage and fury of the
people” made him retreat to the colonial armory that now lacked “men or
ammunition.” 58 By the end of 1775, Wentworth left New Hampshire forev-
er.59
Terrorizing the royal governor destabilized New Hampshire’s status as a
British colony, and questions emerged about who should decide what hap-
pened next. New Hampshire residents mustered a “provincial congress” and
militias to resist imperial troops.60 Yet as a legal matter, colonists did not act
alone in composing a new government. They urgently sought instructions
from the Second Continental Congress:
We would have you immediately use your utmost endeavours to obtain the
advice and direction of the Congress, with respect to a method for our ad-
ministring Justice, and regulating our civil police. We press you not to de-
lay this matter, as, its being done speedily . . . will probably prevent the
greatest confusion among us.61
The Continental Congress itself was an improvised entity with uncertain
authority. One historian called Philadelphia’s motley group of politicians
“no doubt the strangest government we have ever had.”62 Nevertheless, Con-
gress answered New Hampshire’s request with formal legal recommenda-
tions. Local patriots should “call a full and free representation of the people”
and, “if they think it necessary, establish such a form of government, as, in
their judgment, will best produce the happiness of the people, and most ef-
fectually secure peace and good order in the province.”63
Did the Continental Congress have valid authority to promote anti-
imperial policies?64 Could New Hampshire have created a government with-
56. John Wentworth, Seizure of Arms and Powder at Fort William and Mary. The Finale
of the Provincial Government in New-Hampshire., 23 NEW ENG. HIST. & GENEALOGICAL REG.
274, 274–78 (1869) (letters of Governor Wentworth, Nov. 9, 1774).
57. Id. at 277.
58. Id. at 278.
59. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 54, at 5.
60. Id. at 5, 7; LYNN WARREN TURNER, THE NINTH STATE: NEW HAMPSHIRE’S
FORMATIVE YEARS 10 (1983).
61. 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 298 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1905) [hereinafter J.C.C. (1905)].
62. PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE, at xxi (1997).
63. J.C.C. (1905), supra note 61, at 319.
64. The Continental Congress had already taken similar actions concerning Massachu-
setts—at the latter’s request—but Massachusetts did not produce a formal document establish-
ing anti-imperial government. Hulsebosch, supra note 21, at 770–71. Most colonies simply
followed the Continental Congress’s instructions directly, as though the latter were sufficient
authorization in themselves. See id. at 778; 2 J.C.C. (1905), supra note 61, at 77, 83–84.
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out anyone’s approval?65 The best answers to those questions of legal theory
involve actions that the respective governments took in practice. Coopera-
tion and coordination among colonial and intercolonial leaders made it un-
necessary to resolve abstract and potentially delicate issues about who was
sovereign over whom—or what sovereign superiority even meant in this
context. New Hampshire’s effort to recompose its government deliberately
exhibited profound interdependence. According to Congress, New Hamp-
shire’s government was supposed to continue only “during . . . the present
dispute between G[reat] Britain and the colonies.”66 No one knew how long
that dispute would last.
On January 5, 1776, New Hampshire’s arguably treasonous provincial
politicians implemented Congress’s arguably treasonous recommendations,
creating a new government that was operationally detached from homeland
British law but intimately connected to intercolonial authority.67 New
Hampshire explained that the “Sudden & Abrupt Departure of his Excellen-
cy John Wentworth . . . and Several of the Council” left the colony “Destitute
of Legislation, and no Executive Courts being open to Punish Criminal Of-
fenders; whereby the Lives and Propertys of the Honest People of this Colo-
ny, are Liable to the Machinations & Evil Designs of wicked men.”68
Such complaints about Wentworth’s departure were crocodile tears, and
New Hampshire residents were not pining for new royal courts “to Punish
Criminal Offenders.”69 New Hampshire residents were not trying to restore
British officialdom. They were announcing new legal authority to “Pursue
Such Measures as we Should Judge best for the Public Good.”70 Most im-
portant, New Hampshirites did not act entirely on their own initiative,
which is why they did not invoke foundational or organic localism as a
source of legal authority. On the contrary, New Hampshire’s radical charter
expressed colonists’ wish “to establish Some Form of Government, Provided
that Measures should be recommended by the Continental Congress.”71
Modern observers might not expect colonial dissidents in a revolution-
ary context to worry so much about legal technicalities. But it was only after
“a Recommendation to that Purpose [was] Transmitted to us From the Said
Congress” that the New Hampshire assembly sought to “Take up CIVIL
GOVERNMENT for this Colony . . . . During the Present Unhappy and Un-
65. For eighteenth-century arguments that New Hampshire’s constitution was invalid
notwithstanding the Continental Congress’s support, see Bezaleel Woodward, Clerk, Address
at Hanover (July 31, 1776), reprinted in 10 NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE PAPERS 229, 229–35 (Con-
cord, N.H., Edward A. Jenks 1877), https://sos.nh.gov/archives-vital-records-records-
management/archives/publications-collections/new-hampshire-state-papers/ (follow link to
“Volume 10” to view full volume).
66. J.C.C. (1905), supra note 61, at 319.
67. FRIEDMAN, supra note 54, at 5–6.
68. N.H. CONST. of 1776.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (emphasis added).
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natural Contest with Great Britain.”72 Through their explicit language and
legal actions, New Hampshire politicians relied on the Continental Congress
for authorization because they did not wish to act alone. The result was to
produce a hybrid and mutually reliant legal entity from top to bottom.
New Hampshire’s leaders did not call their document a “constitution,”
much less did anyone seek to identify a “state.”73 Nonetheless, the event
marked a new beginning. The governmental plan created exclusively North
American institutions to regulate a self-identified “Colony of New-
Hampshire” outside homeland British authority.74 The document also in-
cluded medium-term electoral rules and bureaucratic responsibilities, just in
case “the Present unhappy Dispute with Great Britain Should Continue
longer than this present year.”75
New Hampshire did not declare sovereign autonomy, emphasizing that
“we Never Sought to throw off our Dependence upon Great Britain.”76 And
whatever this new kind of “New Hampshire” was supposed to be, it absolute-
ly was not independent from intercolonial authority. On the contrary, “we
Shall Rejoice if Such a reconciliation between us and our Parent State can be
Effected as shall be Approved by the CONTINENTAL CONGRESS in whose
Prudence and Wisdom we confide.”77 The new provincial legislature was an
explicitly tentative and subordinate entity, whose governmental institutions
were authorized to function only insofar as “the Continental Congress Give
no Instruction or Direction to the Contrary.”78 Constitutive legal actions
were taken at both levels of government, interdependently, and at the same
time.
The second colony to act was South Carolina, and its history paralleled
that of New Hampshire. After South Carolina’s governor was physically
threatened in the fall of 1775, he fled in January 1776.79 As with New Hamp-
shire, South Carolina’s politicians sought approval from the Continental
Congress before they attempted any governmental reorganization.80 On No-
vember 4, 1775, Congress recommended that a “full and free representation
of the people” should establish a new form of government.81 And on March
72. Id.
73. See id. (using the word “state” exclusively to describe Great Britain as New Hamp-
shire’s “parent state”); Hulsebosch, supra note 21, at 777 (describing New Hampshire’s “act of
civil government”).





79. Robert A. Olwell, “Domestick Enemies”: Slavery and Political Independence in South
Carolina, May 1775–March 1776, 55 J.S. HIST. 21, 45–46 (1989).
80. ADAMS, supra note 5, at 57; Terry W. Lipscomb, The South Carolina Constitution of
1776, 77 S.C. HIST. MAG. 138 (1976). See also J.C.C. (1905), supra note 61, at 326–27; S.C.
CONST. of 1776.
81. J.C.C. (1905), supra note 61, at 320, 326.
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26, 1776, South Carolina became the first colony in British North America to
produce a “constitution” under that name.82 South Carolinians insisted that
they wanted to accommodate “the unhappy differences between Great Brit-
ain and America,” despite being “treated as rebels” by homeland British offi-
cials.83 South Carolina’s document was not optimistic about transatlantic
reconciliation, however, and collective resistance to British imperialism
throughout the colonies made their provincial constitution seem every day
more permanent.
As an exercise of interdependent governance, South Carolinians asserted
their new constitution’s legitimacy by repeating exact language from Con-
gress’s authorization, promising “a full and free representation of the people
of this colony.”84 Provincial actors did not act as though they were locally in-
dependent sovereigns. They were constructing a legal system that was inten-
tionally mixed together with intercolonial authority. South Carolina’s
constitution said that “the resolutions of the Continental Congress, now of
force in this colony, shall so continue until altered or revoked by them.”85 The
opposite of announcing absolute local sovereignty and self-governance,
South Carolina’s constitution disclaimed authority for provincial legislators
to contradict intercolonial resolutions—thereby granting the Continental
Congress power that intercolonial officials could not have claimed on their
own. South Carolina’s constitution vested power in the Continental Con-
gress at the same time that the province was claiming power for itself.
The South Carolina Constitution did assert slightly more self-sufficiency
than New Hampshire, perhaps reflecting the southern document’s emer-
gence later in time. New colonial officeholders promised to “support, main-
tain and defend the Constitution of South Carolina” until disputes with
Great Britain could be amicably resolved.86 But South Carolina’s Constitu-
tion also provided that the new colonial legislature must choose “delegates of
this Colony in the Continental Congress.”87 As a matter of legal rhetoric and
action, the establishment of provincial government was linked with authori-
ty to obtain representation and participation in the intercolonial Congress.
Systems of local and intercolonial authority appeared together as compara-
bly elemental parts of South Carolina’s “constitution.” This again was a legal
expression of interrelationship, not autonomy.
Modern observers often call documents from New Hampshire and
South Carolina “the first state constitutions,” but that shifts them anachro-
nistically forward in time, while also neglecting the creation of statehood as a
82. S.C. CONST. of 1776.
83. Id.
84. Id. art. I.
85. Id. art. XXVIII (emphasis added).
86. Id. art. XXXIII.
87. Id. art. XV.
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legal category.88 In the spring of 1776, there certainly were not any legal
“states” called New Hampshire or South Carolina. None of North America’s
colonial governments claimed that status, nor were they asserting independ-
ence from Britain, and the latter was a necessary predicate for any legal form
of anticolonial statehood.
Cultural, social, and political continuities throughout the revolutionary
era cannot erase the constitutive difference between colonies and states as
legal entities. Properly understood, early efforts of New Hampshire and
South Carolina to challenge British authority reveal the creation of mutually
reinforcing legal entities that tried to mimic other colonies while urgently
pursuing intercolonial authorization and support. Such legal language and
documents were always seeking to achieve the “constitution” of something
bigger than a merely isolated, autonomous locality. The precarious circum-
stances and political ambitions of revolutionary war would require state and
interstate governments all at once.
The next step in the history of statehood was May 10, 1776. Citing the
British Empire’s declining functionality, the Continental Congress recom-
mended that all assemblies and conventions in “the United Colonies” should
“adopt such government as shall, in the opinion of the representatives of the
people, best conduce to the happiness and safety of their constituents in par-
ticular, and America in general.”89 Much like earlier documents from New
Hampshire and South Carolina, the colonial and state constitutions that exe-
cuted those instructions were never purebred expressions of organic local-
ism.90 They were the direct result of intercolonial prompts from Congress.
The congressional recommendation of May 10 transcended any particu-
lar colony’s circumstances or requests. The intercolonial government relied
on its own initiative and judgment in suggesting that each colony should
overthrow officials and create new governmental forms.91 To be sure, Con-
gress did not prescribe a substantive template for colonies to follow, and
provincial documents were drafted in particular locations by diverse “Repre-
88. E.g., William Clarence Webster, Comparative Study of the State Constitutions of the
American Revolution, 9 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 64 (1897).
89. 4 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 341–42 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1906) [hereinafter J.C.C. (1906)].
90. Listed in chronological order, state constitutions after the May 10 resolution were
issued by Virginia (June 29, 1776), New Jersey (July 3, 1776), Delaware (September 21, 1776),
Pennsylvania (September 28, 1776), Maryland (November 11, 1776), and North Carolina (De-
cember 18, 1776). 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3812 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909); 3 id. at
2594; 1 id. at 562; 5 id. at 3081; 3 id. at 1686; 5 id. at 2787. Constitutions from Georgia and New
York followed in 1777, and Massachusetts produced a constitution in 1780. 1 id. at v, vii, x.
Connecticut and Rhode Island continued to govern under their colonial charters throughout
various fractions of the nineteenth century. Id. at iv, xii.
91. ADAMS, supra note 5, at 51.
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sentatives of the People.”92 For present purposes, however, the point is to
show that layers of government were interdependent, not to measure their
relative importance against one another. The Continental Congress directed
that reforms should be considered throughout “the United Colonies,” with
an eye toward the benefit of “their constituents in particular” as well as the
collective benefit of “America in general.”93
Functional togetherness was a pervasive characteristic of the legal insti-
tutions that gradually emerged. The legal existence of provincial govern-
ments was repeatedly braided together with the similarly new Congress, as
they both represented efforts to reform or replace British imperial govern-
ment. In that wartime context, so-called “state constitutions” could never be
isolated acts of local self-recognition. From the start, colonial and intercolo-
nial governments aimed to serve harmonious objectives and perform over-
lapping functions.
One reason that the Continental Congress endorsed new provincial gov-
ernments was to boost political support for independence, intercolonial op-
position, and revolution that were increasingly probable and imminent.94 On
May 15, the Continental Congress wrote a preamble elaborating its motive
for authorizing provincial governments. The King and Parliament had mis-
treated the “United Colonies,” ignored their petitions for redress, and mus-
tered armies for war. Under such circumstances, “it appears absolutely
irreconcileable . . . for the people of these colonies now to take the oaths and
affirmations necessary for the support of any government under the crown
of Great Britain.”95 Therefore, Congress claimed “it is necessary that the ex-
ercise of every kind of authority under the said crown should be totally sup-
pressed, and all the powers of government exerted, under the authority of
the people of the colonies.”96 Creating new provincial governments allowed
colonies to resist “hostile invasions and cruel depredations of their enemies,”
including British officials from the colonists’ ostensible legal homeland.97
The intercolonial resolution and preamble did not use precise legal ter-
minology about independence, states, or nationhood. Nevertheless, they
characterized imperial mistreatment of any single colony—especially Massa-
chusetts—as a terrible sin against all of them.98 This legal justification for
92. See id. at 63. Richard Lee asked John Adams whether perhaps the Continental Con-
gress should draft uniform charters for state governments to adopt. As a modern scholar ex-
plained, “Lee’s premise that the states were building new governments primarily so that they
could work together . . . was obvious at the time, but is now largely forgotten.” Hulsebosch,
supra note 21, at 783.
93. J.C.C. (1906), supra note 89, at 342.
94. See WOOD, supra note 32, at 132.
95. J.C.C. (1906), supra note 89, at 357–58.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 342, 357–58; see Don Higginbotham, War and State Formation in Revolution-
ary America, in EMPIRE AND NATION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD
54, 58–59 (Eliga H. Gould & Peter S. Onuf eds., 2005).
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new provincial governments tactically aggregated and amalgamated colonial
wrongs, so that each individual colony—whatever its practical circumstanc-
es—could be equally aggrieved as a matter of law. Congress linked the osten-
sibly individuated response of creating local constitutions together with
coordinated and collective preparation for intercolonial resistance, which
eventually included war.99 In May 1776, protorevolutionary colonists at all
levels of government hoped that new provincial institutions and new inter-
colonial institutions might emerge and continue as legally interdependent
and co-constitutive entities. Separate statehood would obviously have been a
recipe for political failure and military defeat.
Congress’s use of the words “colonies” and “United Colonies” did not
refer to legal entities that were controlled by Britain, and neither the resolu-
tion nor the preamble sought to invoke British imperial authority. On the
contrary, the Continental Congress used its own questionably legitimate
powers to manufacture provincial governments of equally questionable legit-
imacy, in order that “every kind of authority under the [British] crown
should be totally suppressed.”100 The resolution and preamble implied that
disgruntled colonists could choose to unseat governors, displace judges, and
disobey their King with an authorizing citation to the Continental Congress.
But of course, no one except protorevolutionary Americans would accept
Congress’s authority in the first place. Despite such inevitable risks of circu-
larity, the lean-to architecture of American law was effective. In 1776, multi-
ple layers of interdependent government seemed indispensable, and every
North American colony that created a new governmental charter did so with
some kind of encouragement from Congress.101
Revolutionary Virginia—the largest and strongest insurgent colony—
offers one more example of interdependent provincial charters. On the same
day that Congress issued its preamble in May 1776, a convention of Virgini-
an dissidents unanimously resolved that their delegates in the Continental
Congress should “propose to that respectable body to declare the United
Colonies free and independent States, absolved from all allegiance to, or de-
pendance upon, the Crown or Parliament of Great Britain.”102 Virginian col-
onists understood that their provincial government should be secondary in
both of those legal projects. Virginians authorized intercolonial representa-
tives to make whatever “declaration” and take “whatever measures may be
99. See JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 17, 61–62 (1979); Higginbotham, supra note 98, at
61–62.
100. J.C.C. (1906), supra note 89, at 357–58; see RAKOVE, supra note 98, at 65–66.
101. ADAMS, supra note 5, at 60–93.
102. Preamble and Resolution of the Virginia Convention, May 15, 1776, Instructing the
Virginia Delegates in the Continental Congress to “Propose to That Respectable Body to De-
clare the United Colonies Free and Independent States” (1776), reprinted in DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, H.R. DOC. NO.
69-398, at 19, 20 (Charles C. Tansill ed., 1927) [hereinafter Virginia Resolution] (emphasis
omitted); JOHN DINAN, THE VIRGINIA STATE CONSTITUTION 4 (2d ed. 2014).
October 2020] A Revolutionary History of American Statehood 25
thought proper and necessary by the Congress for forming foreign alliances,
and a Confederation of the Colonies, at such time and in the manner as to
them shall seem best.”103
Virginia’s own state convention prescribed that the Continental Con-
gress was the best institution for declaring independence, organizing a con-
federation, and transforming “Colonies” into “States.”104 Even powerful Vir-
Virginia did not claim statehood alone, much less did Virginians explain
what statehood or interstatehood should mean. All of those were matters for
Congress to debate and resolve as a collective matter, uniformly, and across
the board. The legal category of statehood itself did not belong to—and was
not defined by—any state on its own.
The Virginia Resolution contained one provincially oriented caveat,
which echoed earlier provisions from New Hampshire and South Carolina:
“That the power of forming Government for, and the regulations of the in-
ternal concerns of each Colony, be left to the respective Colonial Legisla-
tures.”105 Subsequent territorial disputes make it especially hard to say where
Virginia’s “internal concerns” were located as a geographic matter, much less
as an analytical one.106 For present purposes, the crucial detail is that Virgin-
ians and congressional politicians reached the same legal conclusion on the
very same day: both levels of government agreed that protorevolutionary
colonists must use intercolonial mechanisms to announce independence and
their own statehood as well.
Virginia’s colonial convention used its own legal authority—whatever
that might have been at the time—“to prepare . . . such a plan of Govern-
ment as will be most likely to maintain peace and order in this Colony, and
secure substantial and equal liberty to the people,” but only if the Continen-
tal Congress endorsed such an enterprise.107 On the other side, Congress was
ignorant of Virginia’s actions but endorsed the same conclusion—invoking
equally questionable intercolonial authority to license a new governmental
plan drafted by and for Virginians.108 Multiple revolutionary entities ex-
pressed mutually resonant ideas about the complex legal environment that
they were occupying and helping to create. As colonists inaugurated formal
authorities that were outside of and contrary to British imperialism, perhaps
it seemed important for everyone to pile on at once.
103. Virginia Resolution, supra note 102 (emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See infra Section II.C (describing eighteenth-century territorial disputes); Section
III.C (suggesting that political institutions should define what qualifies as “internal”).
107. Virginia Resolution, supra note 102. For the historical status and genealogy of “con-
ventions” in Anglo-American legal practice, see HULSEBOSCH, supra note 23, at 171, and
WOOD, supra note 32, at 310–43.
108. Compare Virginia Resolution, supra note 102, with J.C.C. (1906), supra note 89, at
342.
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Joining New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Virginia, seven other
states ratified constitutions in the months surrounding the Declaration of
Independence.109 Most of those legal innovations cited Congress’s resolution
and preamble from 1776 as an undefined mixture of political and legal sup-
port, without considering whether any state hypothetically could have acted
alone.110 Many states were likewise affected by the actions of New Hamp-
shire and South Carolina, which Congress had authorized and requested. As
a matter of legal language and action, interstate cooperation occurred self-
consciously and deliberately in multiple venues, channels, and institu-
tions.111
Eighteenth-century legal evidence shows that state constitutions were
never isolated or organically local phenomena, nor did those provincial doc-
uments represent simple applications of European philosophy or interna-
tional law.112 Regardless of whether one considers purpose and function,
formal legal authority, or bare chronology, revolutionary Americans pursued
state and interstate governments all together. Even documents that are as-
sumed to be state-centric, from a supposedly state-centric historical period,
do not reveal state authority as something antecedent or normatively superi-
or to interstate authority. States and the United States were bound together
from the start.
B. Whose Independence?
This Article’s second group of materials concerns formal independence
from Britain. Many observers have debated which American entities were
first to claim independence as a matter of anti-imperialist pride.113 By con-
trast, this Section examines early declarations to describe the mutual inter-
dependence of legal entities that emerged. Neither the Declaration of
Independence, nor similar actions undertaken by individual provinces, are
sufficient to support states-first histories of American law.
1. Intercolonial Independence
Three colonial legislatures—North Carolina, Massachusetts, and Rhode
Island—took small and early steps toward independence. However, those
actions did not establish legal autonomy from intercolonial government,
much less did they establish local provinces as normatively superior to the
Continental Congress. On April 12, 1776, North Carolina’s Halifax Resolves
109. MAIER, supra note 62, at 163–64.
110. See id.
111. See ADAMS, supra note 5, at 56–62.
112. For complex and nuanced intersections concerning statehood and the law of na-
tions, see sources cited supra note 23.
113. See Richard N. Current, That Other Declaration: May 20, 1775-May 20, 1975, 54
N.C. HIST. REV. 169, 170 (1977).
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charted a path that other colonies hopefully would follow.114 North Carolina
authorized its delegates in the Continental Congress “to concur with the del-
egates of the other Colonies in declaring Independency, and forming foreign
alliances.”115 Like Virginia’s resolution one month later, the Halifax Resolves
purported to “reserv[e] to this Colony the sole and exclusive right of forming
a Constitution and laws for this Colony.”116 And they also “reserv[ed]” to
North Carolina the power of “appointing delegates from time to time . . . to
meet the delegates of the other Colonies for such purposes as shall be hereaf-
ter pointed out.”117
If this was legal independence, it was an interdependent way to claim it.
North Carolina did not assert inherent or foundational sovereignty that
guaranteed authority to decide its legal fate. Instead, North Carolina repeat-
edly acknowledged its status as a “Colony,” while expressing its hope that
other colonies’ congressional delegates might concur in a collective legal de-
cision to secede and begin their uncharted future together. North Carolina
asserted a “sole and exclusive right” to regulate itself alongside an equally
“sole and exclusive right” to participate in intercolonial government.118 In
starting to construct a post-British legal system, North Carolina’s representa-
tion in collective decisionmaking was comparably vital to its authority over
provincial matters. Both categories would matter a lot during wartime con-
flict and international diplomacy, and any formal legal status for North Car-
olina clearly required intercolonial independence from Britain. The “colony”
of North Carolina explicitly vested authority concerning all of the latter is-
sues in the Continental Congress.119
By comparison, Massachusetts was an immediate target for British im-
perial power, and on May 1, 1776, it replied with legislation that modern
readers might characterize as fussy.120 The colonial assembly required “the
Third King of Great Brittain” to be terminologically replaced in certain legal
documents with “the Government & People of the Massachusetts Bay in
New England.” The assembly also ordered that documents “in this Colony”
114. See David T. Morgan & William J. Schmidt, From Economic Sanctions to Political
Separation: The North Carolina Delegation to the Continental Congress, 1774-1776, 52 N.C.
HIST. REV. 215, 230–31 (1975).
115. 10 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 512 (William L. Saunders ed.,




119. See supra notes 102–108 and accompanying text (discussing similar actions by Vir-
ginia one month later).
120. An Act for Establishing the Stile of Commissions Which Shall Hereafter be Issued
and for Altering the Stile of Writs Processes, and all Law Proceedings Within this Colony and
for Directing how Recognizances to the Use of this Government Shall for the Future be Taken
and Prosecuted (May 1, 1776), reprinted in N.Y. HIST. SOC’Y, DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
BY THE COLONY OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, MAY 1, 1776, at 8, 8–11 (n.p. 1862) [hereinafter
MASSACHUSETTS BAY DECLARATION].
28 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:1
should no longer calculate dates using the tenure of British regents.121 Such
details about legal names and dates might seem quite remote from inde-
pendence. Yet Massachusetts justified its decision by listing King George’s
“Great and manifest Greveances,” including an “unjust war” of “Inhumane
and Barbarous treatment” that was “wasting spoiling and destroying the
Country burning Houses and defenceless Towns and Exposing the helpless
Inhabitants to every misery.”122 Those abuses, along with the colony’s mili-
tary deployments and deaths, meant that “the absurdity of Issuing [legal
documents] . . . in the name and stile of the King of Great Brittain is very ap-
parent.”123 For Massachusetts, legal symbolism felt much more visceral after
soldiers killed and died in military conflicts at Lexington and Concord.124
Rhode Island’s legislature behaved similarly on May 4, 1776, theorizing
that “protection and allegiance are reciprocal; the latter being only due in
consequence of the former.”125 The King’s alleged misconduct caused Rhode
Island to revoke colonial legislation requiring allegiance to homeland British
law.126 Like Massachusetts, Rhode Island prescribed that legal documents
should invoke authority “of the English Colony of Rhode Island” instead of
using royal nomenclature and should calculate dates without “year of the . . .
reign” benchmarks.127 Rhode Island likewise drafted oaths for local officers,
judges, soldiers, and jurors to uphold colonial law instead of imperial British
authority.128
Legislative actions by North Carolina, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island
illustrate the extremely modest forms of independence that provincial gov-
ernments asserted as separate legal entities. The Revolution did not spark
grand declarations that asserted the autonomy and sovereignty of individual
colonies-or-states. The independence that everyone was waiting for did not
come from particular colonies, but from the Continental Congress as a
whole. Intercolonial independence represented a correspondingly important
event in the legal history of states and statehood.
121. Id. at 9. Similar antiregnal changes to the calendar occurred briefly, and much earli-
er, during the English Commonwealth. See Robert Poole, “Give Us Our Eleven Days!”: Calen-
dar Reform in Eighteenth-Century England, 149 PAST & PRESENT 95, 107–08 (1995).
122. MASSACHUSETTS BAY DECLARATION, supra note 120, at 8–9.
123. Id.
124. See Robert G. Parkinson, War and the Imperative of Union, 68 WM. & MARY Q. 631,
632 (2011).
125. An Act Repealing an Act, Entitled “An Act for More Effectually Securing to His
Majesty, the Allegiance of his Subjects, in his Colony and Dominion of Rhode Island and Prov-
idence Plantation;” and Altering the Forms of Commissions, of All Writs and Processes in the
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Bartlett ed., Providence, A. Crawford Greene 1861) [hereinafter RECORDS OF RHODE ISLAND].
126. Id.
127. Id. at 522–23.
128. Id. at 523–26.
October 2020] A Revolutionary History of American Statehood 29
2. Interstate Independence
In June 1776, a congressional delegate proposed that “these United Col-
onies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States, . . . and that
all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and
ought to be, totally dissolved.”129 This statement was unequivocal, and it ex-
plicitly swapped colonial legal status for statehood. The resolution urged
colonies-or-states to affirm Congress’s proposals through collective interco-
lonial procedures in Philadelphia, not as freestanding entities acting alone. If
any delegates felt that they needed provincial authorization before taking
such intercolonial action, they were urged to act quickly and return to Con-
gress for the decisive vote.130
The Declaration of Independence eventually popularized the term
“United States of America,” and the document was typically identified as a
“unanimous declaration of the thirteen United States of America.”131 Ameri-
can states were once again being legally produced by the same collective
United States that they were also trying to create. The “States” that an-
nounced themselves to the world as “Free and Independent” from Britain
were “thirteen” in number, but they were also “unanimous” and fundamen-
tally “united.” The interrelationship between plurality and singularity was
less analytically complex than the Christian Trinity, yet the legal nature of
thirteen-in-one remained deeply challenging and somewhat mysterious.132
3. The New United States
Responses to the Declaration of Independence were different in various
states. For Rhode Island, becoming a “free and independent State[]” only re-
quired statutory changes, such as renouncing royal allegiance and altering
legal documents.133 That is because the new state government retained its co-
lonial charter—there was no state constitution. Rhode Islanders simply dis-
carded requirements that colonial laws must not be “contrary and repugnant
[ ]to . . . the laws of this our realm of England.”134 Before and after independ-
ence, Rhode Island’s governor was a publicly elected official. Indeed, the ex-
129. 5 J.C.C. (1906), supra note 89, at 425.
130. Id.
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act same person was elected in 1776 and 1777, after a loyalist governor was
removed in 1775.135
When the United States declared its (or their) collective independence,
Rhode Island institutions were already somewhat sheltered from British
oversight.136 In this sense, Rhode Island was definitely a “colony,” but it was
an unusual example of the genre.137 Likewise, Rhode Island’s postindepend-
ence statehood certainly created a new legal status, but there were notable
continuities of provincial government before and after the fact. The most
immediate transformation as Rhode Island became a state was not any revi-
sion of local government but rather its stance on intercolonial independence.
Even as legal statehood and colonialism looked more operationally similar in
Rhode Island than elsewhere, the shift from one to the other certainly felt
dramatic for Rhode Island residents, the interstate Congress, and London’s
public officials.
In stark contrast to Rhode Island’s relative continuity, Delaware never
existed at all as a British colony. American histories have included countless
references to “thirteen original colonies.” But that only illustrates widespread
inattention to legal differences between a colony and a state. The state of
Delaware and even the name “Delaware” were created by the assertion of in-
tercolonial independence, thus illustrating statehood’s novelty and uncer-
tainty in the revolutionary period.138 Delaware eventually invoked and ap-
applied statehood like every other state, and most modern observers have
assumed that it must have previously been a British colony. How could any
revolutionary state exist without first enjoying or suffering colonial status?
Telling the truth about Delaware sheds important light on the source and
origins of statehood as a whole.
Long before the American Revolution, Europeans had called parts of the
region “Zwaanendael,” “New Sweden,” “New Netherland,” “Maryland,” and
“New York.”139 In the late 1700s, however, the area was widely known as the
“Lower Counties of New Castle, Kent, and Sussex on the Delaware.” That is
exactly how delegates introduced themselves to the Continental Congress in
1774.140
The word “lower” reflected the counties’ position on the river, but by the
late 1700s, there was no doubt that they were Pennsylvania’s “counties,” and
135. See 3 THOMAS WILLIAMS BICKNELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 1097–99 (1920).
136. PETER CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 30–31 (rev. ed.
1998).
137. See id.
138. See New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 370 (1934).
139. ROBERT L. MADDEX, STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 62–70 (2nd ed.
2006); DANIEL DENTON, BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF NEW YORK, FORMERLY CALLED NEW
NETHERLANDS WITH THE PLACES THEREUNTO ADJOINING (2d ed., New York, William Gowans
1845).
140. 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 21–22 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1904) [hereinafter J.C.C. (1904)].
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even Maryland begrudgingly accepted the fact.141 The Lower Counties never
had their own colonial charter or governor, and they were not recognized as
a separate colony by Britain, Pennsylvania, or any other British entity. The
Lower Counties could not be a British colony by accident, and no prerevolu-
tionary politician claimed that they were.
The Lower Counties were a semiautonomous region whose mixture of
self-determination and subordination was created and sustained by over-
sight from the Pennsylvanian government.142 For example, the Lower Coun-
ties’ legislature and local governments were designed and authorized by
William Penn, and Penn was their colonial leader precisely because he was
the proprietor of Pennsylvania.143
To understand the full importance of Delaware’s statehood, consider the
Lower Counties’ status before independence. In 1754, British officials did
not invite the Lower Counties to an intercolonial conference at Albany, nor
did North American colonists solicit the Lower Counties’ approval for Ben-
jamin Franklin’s Albany Plan of Union.144 For every formal purpose of impe-
rial law, the Lower Counties were similar to Philadelphia’s city
government.145 Neither of those social entities possessed colonial status un-
der the British legal system.
By contrast, when the Massachusetts Assembly gathered opposition to
the Stamp Act in 1765, it addressed all “committees from the Houses of Rep-
resentatives or Burgesses” that were located “in the several colonies on this
continent.”146 The Stamp Act Congress was an episode of practical politics
141. The river’s name has an older history, and so does the name that Europeans often
used for native Lenapes. See BETSY MCCULLY, CITY AT THE WATER’S EDGE: A NATURAL
HISTORY OF NEW YORK 52 (2007); J. Frederick Fausz, An “Abundance of Blood Shed on Both
Sides”: England’s First Indian War, 1609–1614, 98 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 3, 43 (1990);
Alison Olson, The Lobbying of London Quakers for Pennsylvania Friends, 117 PA. MAG. HIST.
& BIOGRAPHY 131, 144–45 (1993); Nicholas B. Wainwright, Tale of a Runaway Cape: The
Penn-Baltimore Agreement of 1732, 87 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 251, 252–60 (1963); see
also PHILIP S. KLEIN & ARI HOOGENBOOM, A HISTORY OF PENNSYLVANIA 187–88 (2d enlarged
ed., Pa. State Univ. Press 1980) (1973).
142. MUNROE, HISTORY OF DELAWARE, supra note 19, at 48–49.
143. The Lower Counties were overseen by the Penn family’s governor, who had unfet-
tered power to veto local legislation. The governor of Pennsylvania could choose the Lower
Counties’ Sheriff, and he could also appoint or remove their justices of the peace and supreme
court. Pennsylvania’s Land Office distributed titles to property in the Lower Counties, and
Pennsylvanian officials handled border negotiations with New York, Maryland, and Native
American groups. Id. at 36–37, 47–49, 52–53. Although certain aspects of the Lower Counties’
extralegal politics, culture, religion, and history were different from other regions of Pennsyl-
vania, the Lower Counties’ legal status as part of Pennsylvania was absolutely clear. See id. at
51–52.
144. ROBERT C. NEWBOLD, THE ALBANY CONGRESS AND PLAN OF UNION OF 1754, at
185–86 (1955).
145. See id. at 121, 170.
146. Proceedings of the House of Representatives, Respecting Sending a Committee to
New York, to Consult with Committees from Other Colonies, on the State of the Country,
June 6, 1765, in SPEECHES OF THE GOVERNORS OF MASSACHUSETTS FROM 1765 TO 1775, at 35,
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instead of legal status, and any governmental entity that could influence
public opinion was better than none.147 For the improvised Stamp Act Con-
gress, political coordination was vastly more important than formal authori-
ty.
The Lower Counties’ importance increased as British imperial power
became vulnerable.148 In 1774, the First Continental Congress focused on
economic and political practicalities, and representatives from the Lower
Counties were accepted as voting members just like Pennsylvania or Massa-
chusetts.149 The Lower Counties joined the resolves that Congress produced
in 1774, confirming that colonial status was not necessary to participate in
boycotts and protests.150 The Lower Counties continued as voting members
of the Continental Congress throughout the Revolution, thereby risking
British punishment for treason and making it impossible to question their
equal status after the war had finished.
On June 15, 1776, Wilmington’s provincial legislature suspended royal
authority and continued operations in the Lower Counties’ own name. That
decision mirrored other colonial efforts to reject and replace British authori-
ty, yet one difference was that the Lower Counties renounced Britain and
Pennsylvania simultaneously.151 It was British imperial law that established
formal connections between the Lower Counties and the rest of Pennsylva-
nia—including Penn’s formal charters and territorial purchases, as well as
the Lower Counties’ semiautonomous institutions.152 The Lower Counties’
act of double independence annihilated both sets of imperial bonds at once.
This was a new beginning for the Lower Counties, and they soon had a
new name as well. On September 10, a constitutional convention declared
that “[t]he Government of the Counties . . . shall hereafter in all Public and
other Writings be called THE DELAWARE STATE.”153 That name change
helped to erase memories of prior subordination to Pennsylvania. These
were no longer merely counties, and they were not a colony either.154 The
region quickly became “The State of Delaware,” equivalent to other states
35–36 (Alden Bradford ed., Boston, Russell & Gardner 1818). The Lower Counties technically
had their own Speaker of the House, and the provincial legislature—created by William Penn
and supervised by Pennsylvania’s governor—was located “in” the North American colony of
Pennsylvania. MUNROE, HISTORY OF DELAWARE, supra note 19, at 43–44.
147. C.A. WESLAGER, THE STAMP ACT CONGRESS 120–25 (1976). Reactions to the Stamp
Act included public rioting, and the Stamp Act Congress itself was a meeting where two or
three delegations (including the Lower Counties) arrived without proper authorization from
their legislative assemblies. Id.
148. See MUNROE, HISTORY OF DELAWARE, supra note 19, at 65.
149. J.C.C. (1904), supra note 140, at 21–22.
150. Id. at 75–81.
151. Munroe, supra note 49, at 106–07.
152. See MUNROE, HISTORY OF DELAWARE, supra note 19, at 37–38.
153. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 1.
154. MUNROE, HISTORY OF DELAWARE, supra note 19, at 69.
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that had chosen to retain their prerevolutionary labels.155 Thirteen states
were creating all together the uniform category of statehood that was seam-
lessly transferred to Delaware despite its unique prerevolutionary history.
The Lower Counties’ subordination made no difference for Delaware be-
cause legal recognition under the new interstate regime was all that mat-
tered. Delaware’s experience once more reveals statehood as an invented and
uniform legal status, created by revolutionary politicians at different levels of
government, rather than a category directly inherited from colonial and sub-
colonial experiences in British North America.156
4. “We Are One”
Many legal steps toward independence illustrate that states and the
United States emerged in the same time period through mutual reliance on
one another. None of the states was recreating itself as merely a “colony” of
the new American empire.157 Yet states also did not claim the international,
cultural, political, or legal independence that would have attached to a newly
created nation or country. Whatever the word “states” meant after inde-
pendence, statehood was never an easy transplant from other models,
whether European colonies, unitary European nations, Dutch or Swiss Re-
publics, or the Iroquois Confederacy.158 Despite highly abstract similarities
among those collective organizations, legal statehood was also new and dif-
ferent. Agreements and actions among states—including the Declaration it-
self—were never straight lines drawn between preexisting governmental
dots. On the contrary, interstate agreements marked legal opportunities to
establish what American states were supposed to be, and also how they were
organized within the United States.159
In 1776, Benjamin Franklin sketched a nearly perfect image of statehood
in the revolutionary era, which contradicts the map-shaped puzzle-piece im-
age that is dominant today.160 The Continental Congress printed money that
artistically described the United States’ legal identity, while financially un-
155. Id.
156. Governments that did not obtain interstate recognition are mostly forgotten, includ-
ing Franklin in modern Tennessee, Transylvania in modern Kentucky, and Westsylvania in
modern Pennsylvania. Even Vermont’s admission to the United States was delayed until 1791.
157. See Donald S. Lutz, The Articles of Confederation as the Background to the Federal
Republic, PUBLIUS, Winter 1990, at 55, 58.
158. See Remarks of James Wilson at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 26,
1787), in STATE CONVENTIONS (1836), supra note 9, at 422; TIMOTHY J. SHANNON, INDIANS
AND COLONISTS AT THE CROSSROADS OF EMPIRE: THE ALBANY CONGRESS OF 1754, at 7–8
(2002).
159. See Patricia S. Florestano, Past and Present Utilization of Interstate Compacts in the
United States, PUBLIUS, Fall 1994, at 13, 14–15.
160. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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derwriting its material future.161 Thirteen states appeared along the periph-
ery as abstract and interlocked rings, with discourteously shortened names
to make the scheme work. States were not only linked with one another; they
also had direct linear connections to the middle, interspersed with triangular
sunbursts radiating from the center outward. The core image included the
words “AMERICAN CONGRESS” encircling a bold declaration: “WE ARE
ONE.” Alongside the many legal documents that have been discussed supra,
this vivid and public image sought to show everyone what statehood and in-
terstate government meant to Franklin and the Continental Congress when
the Revolution began.
162
161. See J. A. Leo Lemay, The American Aesthetic of Franklin’s Visual Creations, 111 PA.
MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 465, 490–91 (1987).
162. Louis Jordan, Continental Currency, COLONIAL CURRENCY, https://coins.nd.edu/Col
Currency/CurrencyText/CC-02-17-76.html [https://perma.cc/QL8Q-XW52]; see also Carla J.
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Just like other documents from this era, Franklin’s printed picture was
almost entirely imaginary and aspirational. In the years that followed, histor-
ical truths about states and statehood were fought on battlefields, litigated in
courtrooms, and paid for in cash. This Article’s distinctive legal history seeks
to uncover ideas about statehood in the moments they were first imagined
and constructed without minimizing other historical evidence and methods.
Much like other declarations of independence, Franklin’s currency in 1776
expressed improvisational and intermingled ideas about statehood that do
not fit comfortably with states-first historical accounts.
C. Where Was Virginia?
A third category of evidence about statehood involves territory. Just as
states were supposed to rule their population and compose interstate entities,
they were also supposed to govern land.163 Throughout British North Ameri-
ca, borders among colonies were established, changed, and contested, in-
cluding the creation of new colonies and the elimination of old ones.164
British authority to create and manage legal borders literally defined a colo-
ny’s existence, and although intercolonial rivals often resolved disputes
among themselves, British law and decisionmakers retained ultimate power
to govern any colony’s territorial scope and status.165 The Revolution began a
new phase of territorial law. Old institutions were set aside, and so were rules
that identified provincial governments—just ask Delaware.166 This transfor-
mation of territorial law paralleled states’ emergence as a new kind of entity,
and here again, the construction of statehood was vital to creating the United
States as a whole.
The Continental Congress borrowed a few ideas from earlier efforts to
reform the old British Empire, but many debates about territorial states and
statehood raised entirely new legal issues.167 For example, delegates fought
about whether the United States could possess its own legal territory, or
whether all land must instead belong to one of the individually component
Mulford, Benjamin Franklin Says “WE ARE ONE,” OUPBLOG (June 28, 2006),
https://blog.oup.com/2016/06/benjamin-franklin-printing-currency-congress/ [https://perma
.cc/U3XG-23N5].
163. See PAUL FRYMER, BUILDING AN AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE ERA OF TERRITORIAL AND
POLITICAL EXPANSION 1–31 (2017).
164. See JOHN P. SNYDER, THE STORY OF NEW JERSEY’S CIVIL BOUNDARIES 1606-1968, at
13–15 (2004); Marc Harris, Pennsylvania’s Border at Lake Champlain: Borders and Contexts in
Colonial North America, 32 HIST. REFLECTIONS 493, 498–99 (2006); Walter B. Scaife, The
Boundary Dispute Between Maryland and Pennsylvania, 9 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 241
(1885).
165. See KLEIN & HOOGENBOOM, supra note 141; Harris, supra note 164, at 498.
166. See supra Section II.B.3.
167. See Lutz, supra note 157, at 58–61.
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states.168 Other debates concerned procedures for limiting or extending
states’ territory, creating new states, and transferring land from states to the
United States.
The most remarkable conflict involved Maryland and Virginia from
1777 to 1781. This dispute emphasized territory’s significance for statehood
and the interstate confederacy as well.169 The shortest version of the story is
that Maryland refused to approve the Articles of Confederation because Vir-
ginia was too big.170 Virginia’s seventeenth-century colonial charter encom-
passed territory “from sea to sea,” stretching from a particular section of
Atlantic coastline to the Pacific Ocean.171 Those claims not only included to-
day’s “West Virginia,” but also a northwest line that extended “[e]ndless[ly]”
into the Great Lakes.172
One of Thomas Paine’s least famous pamphlets contained a drawing of
Virginia’s territorial claims.173 The northwest diagonal absorbed all of mod-
ern Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, as well as parts of Maryland,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York.174 John Locke once wrote that “in
the beginning all the world was America,”175 yet under the law of colonial
charters, a surprising amount was Virginia. After the Revolutionary War, in-
ternational treaties limited Virginian claims along the Mississippi River’s
border with Spain and at British Quebec in the north.176 From Maryland’s
perspective, however, even Virginia’s remaining claims—which had been
168. 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 843 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1907) [hereinafter J.C.C. (1907)] (Oct. 27, 1777); David H. Flaherty, Vir-
ginia and the Marginal Sea: An Example of History in the Law, 58 VA. L. REV. 694, 711–12
(1972).
169. See MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 150–51 (1940).
170. HERBERT B. ADAMS, MARYLAND’S INFLUENCE UPON LAND CESSIONS TO THE UNITED
STATES passim (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Univ. 1885); 11 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 631–32 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1908).
171. Harris, supra note 164, at 495; A Third Charter of K. James I. to the Treasurer and
Company for Virginia (March 12, 1611), reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN
THE YEAR 1619, at 98 (William Waller Hening ed., New York, R. & W. & G. Bartow 1823).
172. See JOHN ALEXANDER WILLIAMS, WEST VIRGINIA: A HISTORY 3 n.1, 10–15 (2d ed.
2001); THOMAS PAINE, PUBLIC GOOD, BEING AN EXAMINATION INTO THE CLAIM OF VIRGINIA
TO THE VACANT WESTERN TERRITORY, AND OF THE RIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE
SAME 8–11 (London, R. Carlile 1819).
173. PAINE, supra note 172, at 9. The original map was strangely turned sideways, such
that the top of Paine’s drawing extended westward toward the unknown Rocky Mountains.
174. See id.
175. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 29 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publishing Co. 1980) (1690).
176. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, Gr. Brit.–US, art. II, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
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unquestionably acceptable and valid for a century under the colonial sys-
tem—were much too large for integration under a new union of states.177
178
Territorial claims under the royal charters of Georgia, North and South
Carolina, Massachusetts, and Connecticut also stretched west to the Pacific
177. See JENSEN, supra note 169, at 150–51; 14 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 619–22 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1909) [hereinafter J.C.C.
(1909)].
178. PAINE, supra note 172, at 11 (reoriented so that north is upward).
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Ocean or “South Seas.”179 New York’s claims were comparably large, and
even more complex.180 The Ohio Valley included conflicting territorial
claims from several different states, and Connecticut argued that almost half
of modern Pennsylvania was in fact Connecticut.181
Colonial borders were relatively narrow in Maryland, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and the Lower Counties because
none of those entities had “South Sea” claims under British law.182 After the
Revolution, the latter group argued that “South Sea” states must surrender
western lands to the United States, perhaps compelled by collective interstate
law if necessary.183 Such territorial reductions would create important na-
tional assets for public sale and revenue, while also reducing territorial dis-
parities among the thirteen individual states.184
Every state acquiesced and accepted the Articles of Confederation except
Maryland, but the latter’s resistance was legally dispositive.185 Congress pro-
posed the Articles of Confederation in June 1776 and submitted a final draft
for approval in November 1777.186 Yet the requirement of unanimous con-
sent meant that the Articles were not legally operative until 1781.187
Throughout that period, the improvisational Continental Congress contin-
ued asserting independence from Britain, waging war, negotiating treaties,
and printing currency.188 Without a collective charter or constitution, how-
ever, the United States’ formal legal basis was obscure or nonexistent.
Virginia claimed that every state possessed the same territory that it held
as a colony.189 Invoking a notably formal view of statehood, one Virginian
exclaimed, “How came Maryland by its land, but by its charter? By its char-
ter, Virginia owns to the South Sea. Gentlemen shall not pare away the Col-
ony of Virginia. Rhode Island has more generosity than to wish the
Massachusetts pared away. Delaware does not wish to pare away Pennsylva-
179. Harris, supra note 164, at 495 & n.3.
180. Id.; see also HULSEBOSCH, supra note 23, at 99–100.
181. Harris, supra note 164, at 496–97.
182. Id. at 495 & n.3.
183. William F. Swindler, Our First Constitution: The Articles of Confederation, 67 A.B.A.
J. 166, 169 (1981).
184. Id.
185. JENSEN, supra note 169, at 150–51.
186. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, Historical Background (as recounted by the
Government Printing Office).
187. J.C.C. (1907), supra note 168, at 1; Randall G. Holcombe, Constitutions as Con-
straints: A Case Study of Three American Constitutions, 2 CONST. POL. ECON. 303, 312–13
(1991); Swindler, supra note 183, at 166, 169.
188. WOOD, supra note 32, at 355; Ben Baack, Forging a Nation State: The Continental
Congress and the Financing of the War of American Independence, 54 ECON. HIST. REV. 639,
640–42 (2001).
189. See Merrill Jensen, The Cession of the Old Northwest, 23 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 27,
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nia.”190 If states would not respect British territorial law as an immoveable
anchor, Virginians implied that states themselves would be nothing at all.
This was a notably Anglocentric thesis coming from a group of anti-British
revolutionaries. Yet Virginia analogized to private property, claiming that
“[a] man’s right does not cease to be a right, because it is large; the question
of right must be determined by the principles of the common law.”191 State
territory must derive from colonial charters, unchanged by war or independ-
ence, much less by vague threats of interstate compulsion. Without fierce
protection for states’ territorial boundaries, Virginians argued that the entire
project of statehood would be utterly doomed. As a category, states would
not be much better than colonies, and Virginia in particular would be sub-
stantially worse.
Maryland espoused a different legal vision of statehood, implying that
the motto “novus ordo seclorum”—new order of the ages—also prescribed a
new territorial order based on functionality and mutual respect.192 Maryland
believed that its very existence would be threatened by a brotherhood with
such oversized siblings.193 In particular, Maryland feared that Virginia’s ex-
pansive territory would allow lucrative public land sales and low tax rates,
thus siphoning Maryland’s best families to Virginia and abandoning Mary-
land’s political economy to deflation or collapse.194
Maryland renounced the kind of antique British charters that had regu-
lated colonies in accordance with homeland imperial interests. Any confed-
eration of revolutionary states must yield workable and equitable results for
each component. Maryland thus characterized territorial statehood as some-
thing more than the dead-hand creature of “common law” and imperial
mandates. State territory was supposed to create a new and living framework
for the United States itself. Insofar as Virginia’s territorial claims threatened
ruinous subservience as a practical matter, Maryland defended its sovereign
statehood and rejected the confederation.195
But what was the legal basis for Maryland’s sovereign statehood in the
first place? Somewhat ironically, it was the Articles themselves. The Conti-
nental Congress alone had required that the Articles should “be proposed to
the legislatures of all the United States” and approved by unanimous con-
sent.196 Interstate law was the only legal mechanism that allowed individual
190. 2 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES 502 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1850). The speaker did not address the
proper legal basis for Delaware’s territorial claims against Pennsylvania, which might have
been somewhat harder to support using British imperial law.
191. Id.
192. J.C.C. (1909), supra note 177, at 619–22; see Swindler, supra note 183, at 169.
193. See JENSEN, supra note 169, at 150–51.
194. Jensen, supra note 189, at 36.
195. JENSEN, supra note 169, at 150–51.
196. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, Conclusion; J.C.C. (1907), supra note 168, at
1.
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states like Maryland to wield veto power over the rest.197 Maryland was not
protecting its land claims under a charter or otherwise. Instead, it was using
interstate law to scale back Virginia’s allegedly “old” dominion, while creat-
ing collective territory for the United States. Without any sense of paradox,
Maryland officials used legal authority provided by the Articles to prevent
those same Articles from becoming law.
Present discussion does not require a detailed explanation of the Mary-
land–Virginia dispute and its resolution. The important point is that,
throughout that multiyear conflict, the territorial scope and legal basis of
American statehood were completely integrated with debates over ratifying
the interstate Articles, even as pressures to ratify the Articles influenced the
scope and basis of territorial statehood. For participants at the time, this was
much more than a debate about where to draw specific boundaries. It was a
decision about two states’ political and economic future, as well as an institu-
tional choice about whether a majority of states could prescribe territorial
mandates through the Continental Congress.
The legal existence and scope of states and statehood did not predate the
Articles of Confederation. Those principles were contested, created, and
compromised alongside the interstate regime itself. To secure Maryland’s
assent, Virginia agreed to cede land from its colonial charter, and New York
proclaimed a western border for the first time in its history.198 Even as specif-
ic disputes were resolved between Maryland and Virginia, however, the Arti-
cles did not address broader vulnerabilities about state borders in other
circumstances. For example, even though the Articles implied that the Unit-
ed States could not possess its own legal territory, the interstate government
unlawfully agreed to accept land cessions from Virginia and other “South
Sea” states as a precondition for Maryland’s ratifying vote.199 The Articles
also failed to protect states against future interstate efforts to curtail or real-
locate lands. As late as 1781, many legal issues surrounding statehood and
territory remained unresolved.
The Constitution represented a large step forward, establishing for the
first time that western lands could legally become the United States’ North-
west Territory instead of merely a state-based entity like Greater Virginia or
Western Connecticut.200 At the same time, the Constitution also included
new guarantees for state-based territory: “[N]o new State shall be formed or
erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by
197. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, Conclusion.
198. Sara Stidstone Gronim, Geography and Persuasion: Maps in British Colonial New
York, 58 WM. & MARY Q. 373, 397–98 (2001); Swindler, supra note 183, at 169.
199. See Craig Green, Creating American Land: A Territorial History from the Albany
Plan to the U.S. Constitution 247–380 (Sept. 2018) (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University)
(on file with author); see generally ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II (“Each State
retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right,
which is not by this confederation, expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress as-
sembled.”).
200. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
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the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of
the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”201
Virginia abandoned its largest claims to western and northern territo-
ries, yet the Constitution also promised that the federal government and par-
ticular states could not convert an existing state’s land into new states
without the older state’s consent. That confirmed the valid borders of larger
states, and it also guaranteed newly created states that they would have the
same territorial integrity as other members of the union. The abstract cate-
gories of state territory and statehood were suddenly more important, but
that augmented status was the result of interstate government rather than its
primordial precursor.
The Constitution guaranteed state representation in federal political in-
stitutions, and its territorial clauses confirmed states as vital parts of the new
order. Although the Constitution is commonly viewed as reducing states’
sovereignty and significance, the actual history is complex. The federal Con-
stitution confirmed and reduced states’ legal authority, and none of those
results was a thunderbolt from blue skies. On the contrary, statehood
emerged gradually from networks of support and interdependence that ex-
isted from the start. Territorial conflicts among states revealed statehood and
national government as interdependent co-creations. Even as territorial
statehood was deeply enmeshed with interstate government, interstate gov-
ernment was produced by individual states that were perennially under con-
struction.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF STATEHOOD
This Article’s main goal is to demonstrate that states and the United
States were simultaneously created and mutually constitutive. That thesis is
enough to displace prevalent errors, raise new questions, and highlight epi-
sodes that have been overlooked. Part II revealed the instability of statehood
during the revolutionary era, and it also sets a new benchmark for discussing
statehood in later periods. Because Americans struggled from the beginning
to resolve legal questions about states and statehood,202 modern observers
should feel new skepticism toward casual assertions about statehood’s intrin-
sic character, nature, or essence in other historical eras. For legal historians,
eighteenth-century materials caution against the overbroad, undersourced
normative claims that pervade public opinion in the twenty-first century.
This Part uses evidence from the Constitution’s creation and ratification
to pursue ancillary objectives. The first task is to show that legal controver-
sies about statehood were not conclusively resolved in the years between the
201. Id.
202. See SAMUEL BANNISTER HARDING, THE CONTEST OVER THE RATIFICATION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS 3 & n.1 (New York, Longmans,
Green, & Co. 1896) (quoting claims from Massachusetts residents in 1778 that, after the war,
“ ‘all distinction of Separate States’ should be abolished, and the union of America be secured
‘by reducing the whole into one great Republick’ ”).
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Articles and the Constitution. Relevant actors did not experience statehood
as a longstanding foundation of American law. How could they? Nor did
discussion reveal universally accepted understandings about statehood in
practice. At the Convention, much as before, the constitutive legal status of
states remained one of America’s “contested truths,” as prominent Ameri-
cans fought on many sides of the issue.203
Second, post-Convention political fights over ratification circulated
overly simple descriptions of statehood that resemble current public dis-
course. Eighteenth-century politicians on both sides of ratification supported
static and state-centric descriptions of preconstitutional states for their own
political purposes. Arguments about preconstitutional statehood were highly
exaggerated in popular pamphlets, yet many observers accept them as histor-
ical truth. This Article seeks to undo the damage, drawing inspiration from
Mary Sarah Bilder’s award-winning book, Madison’s Hand, which recap-
tured the political valence of familiar constitutional debates.204 State-centric
histories of preconstitutional statehood were good political theater during
ratification, but they do not match historical evidence from Part II.
For many politicians, states seemed increasingly stable and important
during the war’s aftermath. Some Americans viewed states as indispensable
pillars that were newly oppositional to a strong interstate union. However,
those arguments were not universally accepted. Most important, such dis-
putes emerged from constitutional struggles in the 1780s rather than existing
timelessly as primordial axioms. In a legal sense, despite strident advocacy,
statehood remained significantly fluid and up for grabs.
A. Serpents’ Teeth, Split Atoms, and Statehood in Orbit
Statehood’s legal complexities traveled to the Convention along with the
delegates themselves. In 1785, George Washington characterized the United
States as an unresolved dilemma: “We are either a United people, or we are
203. See RODGERS, supra note 42, at 16 (“The words we use . . . have been made, remade,
repudiated, fought over. Should someone try to sell you a piece of political goods as an authen-
tic encapsulation of the American political faith, the wise course is to run for cover. We have
been too conflict-ridden a church to have [that kind of] a creed.”).
204. See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 3 (2015) (“Madison’s Notes recorded one man’s view of the writing of a consti-
tution in which the politics and process of drafting the document deferred comprehension of
the Constitution as a unified text.”); see also KLARMAN, supra note 4, at 600 (“The compromis-
es undertaken in Philadelphia . . . illustrate the extent to which the Constitution was a product
of clashing interests rather than dispassionate political philosophizing.”); cf. JONATHAN
GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING
ERA 16 (2018) (explaining that “the Constitution should not be rescued from this [messy parti-
san] context; instead, it should be better understood within it”); id. at 17 (observing neverthe-
less that “arguments and the mental images they form are consequential, even if uttered by the
least sincere, least scrupulous actors”).
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not. . . . If we are not, let us no longer act a farce by pretending to it.”205 No-
tably, Washington characterized the Articles of Confederation as pretending
unity rather than state-based division. But he also knew that states could “act
independently of each other” with unworkable frequency.206 In part because
the Articles lasted only a few years, practical legal relationships among con-
federated and state powers were never entirely clear. Like Washington, many
Americans were initially ambivalent or optimistic about statehood under the
Articles, but practical frustrations eventually prompted constitutional re-
form.
Even at the Convention itself, the mixture of practical and theoretical
arguments was not easy to disaggregate. Bilder characterized debates over
statehood as follows: “To what degree did the small states care about state
sovereignty? [Madison’s notes from the Convention] indicate more concern
about large state political dominance than an ideology of state sovereign-
ty.”207 Bilder claimed that many constitutional arguments at the Convention
were contingent and improvisational. This Article more specifically claims
that there was not any coherent “ideology of state sovereignty” that delegates
could have credibly invoked. Everyone ultimately agreed that states were es-
sential to the constitutional order, as they had been from the start. But there
was not any similar level of agreement about the details, scope, or status of
legal statehood under the new regime.
Consider a few illustrative speeches. James Wilson flatly rejected any
possibility of “each State being sovereign.”208 He did not think state sover-
eignty was an appropriate description of the revolutionary past, much less
was it a worthy goal for the constitutional future. Wilson claimed that, just as
individuals necessarily sacrifice autonomy to accept social order, so does “a
Sovereign State, when it becomes a member of a federal [i.e., confederated]
Governt. If N.J. will not part with her Sovereignty it is in vain to talk of
Govt.” under the existing Articles or the new Constitution.209 Wilson
claimed that an entirely “new partition of the states is desirable, but evidently
and totally impracticable.”210 The territorial scope and boundaries of Ameri-
can states were politically convenient and therefore necessary, but for Wil-
son, they were nothing more glamorous than that. He did not accept state
sovereignty as a historical fact or a normative objective.
205. Letter from George Washington to James Madison (Nov. 30, 1785), in 3 THE PAPERS
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206. Letter from George Washington to James Madison, supra note 205, at 420.
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Alexander Hamilton claimed that it would be completely useless to
amend the Articles while leaving “ ‘the States in possession of their sover-
eignty.’ ”211 He explained as a normative matter that states “are not necessary
for any of the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or agriculture.”212 Only
“[s]ubordinate authorities . . . would be necessary. There must be district tri-
bunals: corporations for local purposes. But cui bono, [who gains from] the
vast & expensive apparatus now appertaining to the States[?]”213 Hamilton
was willing to preserve states as inferior administrative corporations for
practical purposes, but “[a]s states, he thought they ought to be abolished.”214
Although the Constitution ultimately kept the term “states,” questions about
their “sovereignty,” practical “purposes,” and constitutional scope lay quietly
unresolved.
James Madison endorsed a similar proposal that “indefinite power
should be given to the Gen[era]l Legislature, and the States reduced to cor-
porations dependent.”215 That approach would allow flexible political strug-
gles to determine the powers and limits of provincial governments, and “no
fatal consequence would result.”216 Madison later suggested that states
should be “mere counties of one entire republic.”217 The short-term result
would protect small states from abuse by large states, while facilitating the
long-term possibility of “[g]radual partitions” among states and “junctions
of the small (States)” with one another.218 States would be governmentally
and territorially subservient, analogous to colonies in British North America.
A third speech from Madison declared that “States are not sovereign in the
full extent of the term.”219 Even under the Articles, he emphasized that
“States . . . have not such full power, but are deprived of such . . . by the Con-
fedn.”220 Madison thought that far “too much stress was laid on the rank of
the States as political societies,” and he claimed that their limited sovereignty
“in relation to the paramount law of the Confederacy [was] analogous to that
211. BILDER, supra note 204, at 93.
212. RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 208, at 287.
213. Id.
214. Remarks by Alexander Hamilton at the Debates in the Convention of the State of
Pennsylvania on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 19, 1787), in 5 STATE
CONVENTIONS (1845), supra note 10, at 212.
215. BILDER, supra note 204, at 99.
216. Id.; see also Letter from George Washington to James Madison (Apr. 16, 1787), in 5
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 144–45 (W.W. Abbot ed.,
1997) (“[A]n individual independence of the States is utterly irreconcileable with their aggre-
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of bye laws” with respect to ordinary corporations.221 Madison was unwilling
to accept states as foundationally sovereign elements of American govern-
ment, and he also claimed that the Articles had established states as legally
subordinate entities from the beginning.
Most dramatic of all, Gouverneur Morris argued that “State attach-
ments, and State importance have been the bane of this Country. We cannot
annihilate [the States]; but we may perhaps take out the teeth of the ser-
pents.”222 Morris claimed that states were “originally nothing more than co-
lonial corporations.”223 However, the war’s existential pressure required that
“a Governnt. was to be formed,” and during this frantic period, “[t]he small
States . . . taking advantage of the moment, extorted from the large ones an
equality of votes” at the Continental Congress.224 Internal voting rules of
Congress could not change states’ fundamentally subordinate position, how-
ever, and Morris thundered: “What if all the Charters & Constitutions of the
States were thrown into the fire, and all their demagogues into the ocean.
What would it be to the happiness of America.”225 Few delegates agreed with
Morris about states and statehood, but that disagreement is itself the point.
Framers of the Constitution—like the Articles’ framers and earlier Ameri-
cans—did not inherit legal statehood as an established convention. In 1787,
applicable details were not universally understood, much less were they uni-
formly accepted.
Contrary to Morris’s fantasy and other delegates’ nightmare, the Consti-
tution did not eliminate states, burn their constitutions, drown their propo-
nents, or “take out the[ir] teeth.”226 Most delegates could not imagine
221. RECORDS OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 208, at 463–64.
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endorsing such positions, yet some of the brightest and most influential del-
egates argued about statehood’s history and future. Speakers who repeatedly
questioned states’ constitutional status escaped ridicule only because the le-
gal status of statehood remained a disputed issue, as it was from the start.
Fluidity, dynamism, and interdependence characterized statehood through-
out the revolutionary period. Even the process of drafting the Constitution
was another episode of simultaneous debates over interstate government and
the development of statehood itself.
The Constitution’s effort to reimagine interstate government as a federal
republic produced many changes concerning statehood, which variously in-
creased and decreased states’ legal power. For the first time, states lacked
equal voting status; certain rules and tax burdens were tied to population;
relevant numbers were gathered by a federally administered census instead
of states themselves; every manifestation of federal law was explicitly “su-
preme”; and state judges themselves were obliged to respect it.227
On the other hand, congressional representatives were chosen by voters
authorized by state law, senators by state legislatures, and presidential elec-
tors however state legislatures wished.228 Representatives and senators also
had to “[i]nhabit[]” their electoral jurisdictions.229 These were all structural
commitments to states’ continued influence and significance.
Various constitutional provisions explicitly constructed revised concepts
of statehood and interstate government. Sometimes they weakened one side
and strengthened the other, yet the immediate goal was to create a system
that would be politically saleable and operationally workable. The constitu-
tional union never required states to “come together” as a group of prefixed
entities.230 Nor did interstate delegates invent federalism as a summertime
“miracle.”231 Different layers of government legally constructed and rein-
forced one another, while also adapting to dynamic circumstances and new
mechanisms of constitutional law.232 These years were certainly different
from the Revolution and wartime, but there were also similarities.
Some modern observers badly mischaracterize the Constitutional Con-
vention. For example, Justice Kennedy used a metaphor about nuclear fis-
227. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, 3; id. § 3, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; id. art. VI, cl. 2.
Madison reportedly understood this inequality as a transformation of states’ status: “ ‘If each
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sion that is widely quoted: “Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery. The
Framers split the atom of sovereignty.”233 Describing “the genius of their
idea,” Kennedy raved that the “Constitution created a legal system unprece-
dented in form and design.”234 Historical materials from Part II reject Ken-
nedy’s assumption that the “discovery” of federalism or statehood in 1787
was “unprecedented in form and design.”235 States, statehood, and interstate
government were under construction and debate from the beginning. They
remained in process at the Convention and beyond.
By comparison, John Dickinson was a Delaware representative at the
Convention with his own flawed metaphor about constitutional statehood.236
Dickinson’s comparison of pre- and postconstitutional government empha-
sized conceptual similarities more than practical differences.237 After Madi-
son boldly declared that “[w]e are about to form a national Govt. and
therefore must abandon Ideas founded alone in the plan of confedn.,” Dick-
inson replied with conservative astronomy from his own era: “We cannot
abolish the States and consolidate them into one Govt . . . . Let our Govt. . . .
be the Sun and the States the Planets repelled yet attracted, and the whole
moving regularly and harmoniously in their respective Orbits.”238 For Dick-
inson, preserving graceful and established trajectories was indispensable to
any continuation of the United States.
Modern readers cannot sensibly choose between Kennedy’s fission and
Dickinson’s planets. The two metaphors for statehood cannot both be cor-
rect because Kennedy’s dramatic novelty undermines Dickinson’s celestial
continuity. Both descriptions are incomplete because states were simultane-
ously new and old under the Constitution, as they also had been under the
Articles. More important, the metaphors are flawed because during this pe-
riod statehood was nothing like natural science. On the contrary, naturalistic
metaphors risk obscuring the stumbles, disputes, and thoroughly human
processes that pervaded the development of eighteenth-century states.
Whether inadvertently or otherwise, analogizing eighteenth-century state-
hood to natural science is a terrible mistake that elevates rhetorical flourish
above historical truth. There is no evidence that any conception of statehood
was expressed or widely held at the Constitutional Convention, aside from
specific provisions that were written into the text.
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B. To Melt Down States or Make a Nation
After the Convention, debates over statehood moved from elite corri-
dors of power into newspapers and the streets. The Convention’s nuanced
and elaborate discussions remained hidden, even as the final product was
circulated for approval. During this period, Americans heard loud and polar-
ized disputes of yes versus no—“take this or nothing”—in what has been
called “one of the greatest and most probing public debates in American his-
tory.”239 However, modern observers must not mistake political arguments
for accurate legal analysis. Participants in the state convention process “were
not trying to distort history,” but historical distortion is certainly something
they produced.240 Various actors were “struggling to win a very tough fight
on behalf of what they understood as the nation’s welfare in a world where
the rules of the political game were different from those of today.”241 It is not
hard for modern Americans to understand how facts might bend under that
kind of political pressure.
Exaggerated histories of American statehood were especially prevalent.
Constitutional proponents claimed that the Articles imposed hardwired
state-centrism as an unfixable flaw, while constitutional opponents charac-
terized state-centrism as an ancient and priceless treasure. No one spoke
about statehood as a recent and variable category of American law. For Fed-
eralists and Anti-Federalists alike, artificially sharpened pictures of precon-
stitutional states crystallized arguments about ratifying the Constitution,
regardless of whether those political pictures were historically supportable.
Ten months of ratification debate yielded vast amounts of printed mate-
rial, and many more discussions were not recorded or preserved.242 General-
izations are possible only because political leaders were interconnected by
newspapers and friendships, which meant that some arguments followed
patterns or templates. This Article considers a few prominent speakers who
discussed the history of states and statehood during this period. As with
most historical analysis, it is hard to know whether particular speakers were
sincere, much less how their audience might have felt. A narrower goal in
this context is to identify elements of eighteenth-century discussion that re-
semble modern misperceptions about early statehood.
In September 1787, “Centinel” wrote one of the first public critiques,
urging Pennsylvanians to reject the Constitution because “the United States
are to be melted down into one empire.”243 Centinel claimed that “a very ex-
tensive country cannot be governed on democratical principles [except as] a
239. MAIER, supra note 4, at ix; THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 232, at
232.
240. MAIER, supra note 4, at xiv.
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confederation of a number of small republics, possessing all the powers of
internal government, but united in the management of their foreign and
general concerns.”244 Centinel’s thesis was that, although the Articles of Con-
federation formed a workable “confederation of . . . small republics,” the
Constitution did not.245
Both of Centinel’s statements about the Articles were dubious. First, as a
geographic matter, the Articles’ definition of Virginia and other “South Sea”
states could not qualify as “small republics,” and their state boundaries were
contested just a few years before.246 Maryland ratified the Articles only after
the United States agreed to take land that it was not authorized to govern or
possess.247 The Articles’ territorial framework for statehood thus failed be-
fore it began—hardly a persuasive model for governing a “very extensive
country . . . on democratical principles.”248
Centinel was not worried about the actual size of particular states, but
about statehood as a category. Some states looked large on a map, but they
were smaller than a “melted down . . . empire.”249 Centinel assumed that
somehow states would be small enough for “democratical principles.” That is
what Centinel presumed states were and should remain forever. By contrast,
if the Constitution at all diminished states’ supposedly historical status,
America would be “melted,” sliding backward toward the grip of an undem-
ocratic “empire.” This was political theory and political theater, detached
from the fluid history of preconstitutional statehood.
Second, Centinel argued that legal statehood under the Articles was an
effective balance of “internal government” against “foreign and general con-
cerns.” Centinel never analyzed whether the Confederation Congress in fact
adequately served “general concerns,” and the lack of interstate revenue sug-
gested otherwise.250 Constitutional proponents claimed that “critically
dreadful” circumstances meant that, “however reprehensible and exception-
able the proposed plan of government may be, there is no alternative, be-
tween the adoption of it and absolute ruin.”251 Centinel replied that the
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preconstitutional framework for statehood was “a safe and a proper one.”252
Yet Centinel again swapped out practical objections in exchange for theoret-
ical debates, staying focused on the abstract “form of government” instead of
evaluations of operational results. Centinel’s thesis assumed that legal state-
hood was chronologically primary, firmly established, and valuable beyond
any compromise. None of that was true as a matter of legal history.
In January 1788, several other constitutional opponents explained that
they would not accept any constitutional plan that “tended to deprive the
state government of its most essential rights of sovereignty, and to place it in
a dependent situation.”253 Such authors were “opposed to any system, how-
ever modified, which had in object the consolidation of the United States in-
to one government.”254 Again, however, the Constitution’s opponents could
not identify which legal “rights of sovereignty” states were supposed to
have.255 Nor did they mention the dynamic interdependence that created
states and interstate governments in the first place. On the contrary, Anti-
Federalists’ ahistorically invented theory about “sovereign states” was useful
in producing a simplified yes-or-no political choice.
An early public test for the Constitution was the Pennsylvania conven-
tion.256 Opponents claimed that the preamble’s “We the People”—instead of
“We the States”—proved beyond doubt that “the old foundation of the un-
ion is destroyed, the principle of confederation excluded, and a new and un-
wieldy system of consolidated empire is set up, upon the ruins of the present
compact between the states.”257 The new constitutional system was “incon-
trovertibly designed to abolish the independence and sovereignty of the
states individually.”258 One supporter said that “[t]he Sovereignty of [Penn-
sylvania] is ceded to U.S. . . . I am a Citizen of every State,” and an opponent
replied “I never heard [anything] so ridiculous.”259 Constitutional oppo-
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nents’ vision of statehood was easy to summarize: “Sovereignty is in the
States and not in the People—in its Exercise. . . . I wish not to destroy this
[current legal] system: Its Outlines are well laid.”260
The truth was complicated. The Articles were never an ordinary interna-
tional “compact” among preexisting entities. On the contrary, states were
manufactured alongside the interstate government.261 There was not any
moment on the timeline when “state sovereignty” was singularly established,
and even the meaning of that term would have been highly debatable. Any
argument that statehood’s “outlines are well laid” had to ignore a large frac-
tion of United States history. Even though abstract theories of statehood be-
came increasingly popular over time, underlying historical facts remained
awkwardly messy.
After Pennsylvania voted to ratify, twenty-one delegates wrote a dis-
sent.262 They wanted to amend the Constitution so “[t]hat the sovereignty,
freedom and independency of the several states shall be retained, and every
power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this constitution expressly del-
egated to the United States in Congress assembled.”263 Otherwise, the Con-
stitution would “annihilate the state governments, and produce one
consolidated government that will eventually and speedily issue in the su-
premacy of despotism.”264 Once again, opponents presumed that legal state-
hood’s status was historically fixed, which is why they characterized threats
to statehood as categorically new. The political need to resist made Anti-
Federalists mischaracterize states as natural, ancient, and unalterable. Oppo-
nents steered constitutional debates away from political discussion of sub-
stantive regulations or taxes, thus minimizing the Articles’ practical failures.
Instead, opponents argued about structural abstractions, including state sov-
ereignty and dignity, with strong exaggeration for maximum political effect.
On the pro-ratification side, James Wilson was uniquely important at
the Pennsylvania convention.265 Following a standard script, Wilson posed
binary questions of statehood-or-not, and he analyzed the category of state-
hood separate from its policy implications. Invoking high political theory,
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Wilson called the Constitution’s ordering of states a “confederate republic”
that was fundamentally different from everything else in human history.266
Wilson interpreted confederate republics as “a convention, by which several
states agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to estab-
lish. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one, capable
of increasing by means of further association.”267
Wilson never explained why the Constitution’s statehood qualified as a
“confederate republic” but statehood under the Articles did not. Overlooking
practical differences, Wilson casually distinguished the new constitutional
system from “Swiss cantons,” the “United Netherlands,” the “Germanic
body,” and Ancient Greece without any serious discussion of recent Ameri-
can history.268 Instead, Wilson argued as a theoretical matter that preconsti-
tutional statehood—whatever that meant in practice—was so powerful that it
had produced the wrong category of governmental system.269 States under
the Articles could not be molded into a serviceable confederate republic. The
category of statehood itself needed rebirth.
Analogous to the Constitution’s opponents, Wilson characterized ratifi-
cation as something greater than mere policy disputes that could be fixed
through ordinary politics or amendments to the Articles. Because the Con-
stitution was a major structural reform, its proponents focused on corre-
spondingly structural problems. For both sides, state sovereignty became a
useful political tool, and a useful form of language, despite or because of the
concept’s practical instability.
Bypassing details of legal history, Wilson analogized constitutional
statehood to social contract theory. “When a single government is instituted,
the individuals . . . surrender to it a part of their natural independence,
which they before enjoyed as men.”270 Similarly, “[w]hen a confederate re-
public is instituted, the communities . . . surrender to it a part of their politi-
cal independence.”271 Much like imaginary prepolitical individuals who
joined the first government, America’s Constitution required that “states
should resign to the national government that part, and that part only, of
their political liberty, which . . . will produce more good to the whole than if
it had remained in the several states.”272 To describe the problem that way
supported Wilson’s political results as though constitutional restrictions
were inevitable and also ideal.
266. See Remarks by James Wilson at the Debates in the Convention of the State of Penn-
sylvania on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Nov. 26, 1787), in STATE CONVENTIONS
(1836), supra note 9, at 421.
267. Id. (citation omitted).
268. Id.
269. See id. at 430–31.
270. Id. at 429.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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Wilson did not explain how or when states historically acquired, during
their brief postrevolutionary existence, “political liberty” analogous to indi-
viduals’ prepolitical “natural independence.” Nor did Wilson consider
whether states had already “surrender[ed]” their “political independence”
under the Articles.273 Ignoring recent events, Wilson chose to prioritize
dramatic change over incremental reform, supporting that decision with
stark images of the ongoing crisis. Here as elsewhere, Wilson’s analogy to
anarchic individualism promoted theoretical visions of statehood that were
mostly separated from historical facts.
Federalists knew the Constitution would not abolish states, but Wilson
agreed with Anti-Federalists that ratification would reconfigure legal state-
hood. In particular, Wilson defended the Constitution using popular sover-
eignty, and he attacked the Articles as correspondingly defective.
[W]e are told [constitutional change] is a violation of the present Confed-
eration—a Confederation of sovereign states. I shall not enter into an inves-
tigation of the present Confederation, but shall just remark that its
principle is not the principle of free governments. The people of the United
States are not, as such, represented in the present Congress . . . .274
Echoing the speeches of Anti-Federalist rivals, Wilson agreed that the status
quo was all about “We the States,” not “We the People.” Unlike politicians
who thought state-centrism was indispensably useful, Wilson thought state-
centrism was one of the Articles’ most damaging problems.
This Article cannot adequately analyze popular sovereignty, which has
its own mythology and scholarly literature.275 In the revolutionary era, “[t]he
very idea of sovereignty became problematic, and its rhetorical depository,
‘the people,’ an inherently elusive location.”276 Even as the Constitution re-
formulated “the People” and their “more perfect union,” substantial evidence
suggests that Americans also may have experienced states’ rights and sover-
eignty as theoretically “problematic” in comparison to governmental prac-
tice and legal instruments.277 Wilson’s link between popular sovereignty and
statehood confirms that both concepts were strategically designed to high-
light the political need for structural change. Under the Constitution, in con-
trast to the Articles, “[t]he truth is . . . that not the states only, but the people
273. Id.
274. Remarks by James Wilson at the Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsyl-
vania on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Dec. 4, 1787), in STATE CONVENTIONS
(1836), supra note 9, at 458.
275. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 13–15 (1988).
276. ELLIS, supra note 30, at 226.
277. See supra Section III.A.
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also, shall be here represented[.] And if this is a crime, I confess the general
government is chargeable with it . . . .”278
For this Article’s narrow purposes, Wilson’s key tactic was describing
constitutional statehood as something new: “By adopting this system, we be-
come a nation; at present, we are not one. . . . This system . . . [will] make us
a nation, and put it in the power of the Union to act as such. . . . We shall re-
gain the confidence of our citizens, and command the respect of others.”279
In fact, gaining confidence and international respect had been important
goals ever since the Revolution, and the Articles were an embarrassingly re-
cent effort to do so. Why should the new Constitution be different? Wilson’s
optimistic rhetoric emphasized the constitutional system’s theoretical novel-
ty as the means to success. That required him to greatly exaggerate precon-
stitutional statehood’s legal status and solidity, thus distorting America’s
“before” picture in order to yield a more flattering “after.”
Wilson and his adversaries agreed on just one thing about the Constitu-
tion: it would transform the legal system of states and statehood like never
before, while also creating an entirely new kind of nation. Both sides mar-
shalled dramatic and vivid rhetoric, pairing one side’s nightmares of tyranny
and despotism with the other side’s fears of anarchy and collapse. In the ag-
gregate, those tactical choices caused ratification debates to oversimplify im-
ages of preconstitutional states and statehood. The urgency of defending and
attacking the status quo always seemed clearer when advocates characterized
existing conditions as persistent and stable—two things that preconstitu-
tional statehood most certainly was not.
C. Statehood at Last
Ratification had two important results for constitutional statehood.
First, states-rights advocates were substantially defeated. For Anti-
Federalists, ratification meant annihilating statehood, while Federalists
claimed that ratification meant diminishing statehood. Under either inter-
pretation, state conventions voted “yes,” and the nation’s heated debates
quickly cooled. “[T]he score was tallied, and the crowds went home . . . . Af-
ter Congress declared the Constitution ratified and called the first federal
elections, the country rallied behind the new Constitution.”280 The purported
diminution of statehood did not produce immediate or widespread political
resistance against the new constitutional order.281
278. Remarks by James Wilson at the Debates in the Convention of the State of Pennsyl-
vania on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Dec. 11, 1787), in STATE CONVENTIONS
(1836), supra note 9, at 444.
279. Id. at 526–27.
280. MAIER, supra note 4, at 432.
281. More than 200 amendments were proposed in various state conventions, but the ten
that were ultimately ratified said remarkably little about states and statehood. Kenneth R.
Bowling, “A Tub to the Whale”: The Founding Fathers and Adoption of the Federal Bill of
Rights, 8 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 223, 227–28 (1988) (“The majorities and minorities of eight of the
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When the federal government started to operate, many constitutional
proponents were public officials. The first senators were all Federalists ex-
cept two, so was 80 percent of the House, and the Federalist President
George Washington appointed every federal judge and officer.282 Political
struggles and violence continued, but there would no longer be transforma-
tive legal claims that America suddenly “became a nation” or Delaware be-
came “the first state.” Formal efforts to redefine statehood and the United
States were settling down, even as practical statehood and nationhood rapid-
ly grew stronger.
What did postratification practices and results mean for “statehood”?
The Constitution offered several provisions that directly affected states—
making them greater and weaker relative to the Articles—but it also left
many aspects of statehood unresolved. The latter silence is not a basis for
criticism, nor does it imply dysfunction. Every document says something
while the rest is unsaid. The point is that the Constitution’s unanswered
questions were implicitly left for other legal mechanisms to answer—
including political debates, statutes, executive practice, judicial interpreta-
tion, and constitutional amendment.
Given those options, a brief sidenote seems appropriate about the Tenth
and Eleventh Amendments. Those documents were separately ratified in
1791 and 1795, and each of them has a distinctive context and scholarly lit-
erature that cannot be explored here.283 This Article’s research does suggest,
however, that the Tenth Amendment’s reservation “to the States respective-
ly, or to the people” might have echoed earlier disputes about the location of
preconstitutional and extraconstitutional sovereignty.284 The Tenth
Amendment confirmed that the federal government possessed enumerated
powers, and for that purpose, it was not necessary to specify whether power
outside the federal government was vested in “We the States”—as Patrick
Henry and Samuel Adams might have claimed—or in “We the People”—
pursuant to Wilson’s popular sovereignty.
The question of whether the Articles’ residual sovereignty vested in
“States” or “the People” was hotly contested in 1787 and 1788. Perhaps the
Tenth Amendment stepped aside by merely providing that “powers not del-
egated to the United States by the Constitution,” nor prohibited to it by the
states, shall belong to whoever possessed them beforehand. Given the dynamic
and fractured history of preconstitutional statehood, that interpretation
would make the Tenth Amendment a very weak source of states’ rights. Per-
haps the Tenth Amendment changed nothing at all about states’ constitu-
twelve state ratifying conventions that met prior to the First Federal Congress put forth 210
amendments.”).
282. MAIER, supra note 4, at 433–35.
283. See, e.g., THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY: CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES (Mark R. Killenbeck ed., 2002); JOHN V. ORTH, THE
JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(1987).
284. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
56 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:1
tional status, beyond the modest amount that was already textually specified
in 1787.
A slightly larger point about the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments con-
cerns efforts to manufacture a longstanding, inert, and largely implicit histo-
ry of constitutional statehood. Observers sometimes characterize the Tenth
and Eleventh Amendments as incorporating supposedly obvious assump-
tions about statehood from Independence, the Articles, the Convention, rati-
fication debates, or some other unspecified moment.285 The historical
sources in Part II undermine that kind of “silent majority” approach to
statehood.
On the contrary, statehood was legally contested and volatile throughout
the preconstitutional period, with multiple revisions in quick succession.
There simply was no traditional or uniform understanding with respect to
many legal aspects of statehood—including territorial borders—until after
the Constitution was ratified. To support arguments based on the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments, states-rights advocates must show that the years be-
tween 1788 and 1795 produced the kind of widespread understanding about
statehood that was lacking from 1776 to 1788. This Article offers a skeptical
framework for evaluating that kind of argument, but the factual details of-
fered here cannot answer such questions directly.
The second effect of ratifying the Constitution was an ironic victory for
future generations of states-rights advocates. The Constitution’s extraordi-
nary durability transformed ratification into a monumental event, thereby
amplifying attention to debates from that period.286 The Federalist Papers
have eclipsed almost all other eighteenth-century materials about the Consti-
tution in the public imagination, and also in the legal community.287 Such
pamphlets were not written to guide 250 years of government, but as quite
specific political advocacy to attract a majority at state conventions like New
York. One unrecognized consequence of postratification history has been to
memorialize the Federalist Papers’ claims about statehood as timeless consti-
tutional truths, while forgetting their uniquely distortive political context.
This is ironic because victorious eighteenth-century Federalists, for their
part, were exaggerating preconstitutional statehood in the hope that Ameri-
cans would reduce it—and that is what happened. The Constitution offered a
285. See Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1817 (2010); Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission: The Tenth
Amendment, Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1889 (2008).
286. See BILDER, supra note 204, at 3, 15–16.
287. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS:
AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 27 (2002) (describing the Federalist Papers as
“the most important ratification-era discussion of the Constitution’s meaning”); Clinton Ros-
siter, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, at vii (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The Federal-
ist is the most important work in political science that has ever been written, or is likely ever to
be written, in the United States. It is, indeed, the one product of the American mind that is
rightly counted among the classics of political theory.”).
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new framework that the Federalists believed would make statehood less
powerful and more flexible, with incrementally larger input from democratic
opinion across the country. By contrast, states-first histories have used ratifi-
cation debates to support silent reservations of states’ rights, based on prin-
ciples of state sovereignty that were supposedly too familiar for eighteenth-
century actors to specify in the Constitution itself. Contradicting the Consti-
tution’s original proponents, some states-rights theories espouse a vision of
statehood that is marked by rigidity, limits, and antidemocratic formalism—
characteristics that were mostly absent in the eighteenth century itself. The
prevalence of inaccurate histories about statehood might be the strangest
legacy that constitutional ratification ever produced.
IV. THE UNWRITTEN FUTURE OF STATEHOOD’S HISTORY
Although this Article’s goals are mostly descriptive and interpretive, this
Part considers normative implications. Flawed histories of states and state-
hood have appeared almost endlessly throughout American law and poli-
tics.288 Every one of those episodes is an occasion where some set of actors
believed that legal history mattered, and where correcting legal history might
also matter to some degree.
Without trying to single out the most important or recent episodes,289
this Part describes the potential impact of revisionist legal history using three
types of examples. The first is doctrine. John Manning has criticized a group
of Supreme Court cases that he calls “freestanding federalism.”290 This Arti-
cle supports substantive challenges to those decisions that do not require
Manning’s commitment to constitutional textualism.291 Whenever judges or
scholars have cited casual, oversimplified eighteenth-century history to sup-
port their doctrinal arguments, evidence from Part II suggests the possibility
of reconsideration and revision.
Second is politics. Relocating the origins of states-rights doctrines in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries would affirm their historical nexus to
American slavery and racial subordination, while deflating their undeserved
status as “Founders-Chic Federalism.” Revolutionaries began the legal pro-
ject of American statehood, and the Constitution transformed it. Yet much
like the American nation, statehood was mostly composed during the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, periods that are not emphasized enough with
respect to constitutional federalism.
Third is judicial role. Most modern advocates discuss states’ rights based
on functional arguments, with eighteenth-century history as an unexamined
288. See supra notes 3, 9–12 (collecting sources).
289. E.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1493 (2019); Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 434 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
290. Manning, supra note 13, at 2004.
291. I am grateful to Gillian Metzger for focusing my attention on this group of cases and
arguments.
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premise or afterthought. In debates over governmental function, however,
the existence of dynamic changes over time suggest that most decisions
about legal statehood should be made by political institutions instead of con-
stitutional adjudicators. The Constitution is quite clear that States are here to
stay as a formal matter. But statehood’s meaning in practice should be most-
ly flexible and dynamic, as was more emphatically true in the eighteenth cen-
tury.
Scholars have debated federalism for centuries, and excellent work con-
tinues in the realm of constitutional theory and policy.292 This Article joins
that conversation from a distinct historical perspective, rebutting prevalent
assumptions that—during the eighteenth century—everyone somehow knew
what constitutional statehood was supposed to mean. The forgotten history
of statehood does not reveal ancient, stable, or determinate legal status. Evi-
dence from Part II suggests exactly the opposite. It is very clear that flawed
histories of statehood have been used for many doctrinal, political, and insti-
tutional purposes in the past. This Article optimistically and tentatively
hopes that readers will find comparable uses for more accurate histories of
statehood in the future.
This Part sketches a few possibilities that illustrate different levels of
commitment to historical evidence. For judges and intellectuals who view
eighteenth-century experience as intrinsically important or decisive, new
historical evidence might alter modern judgments about operative doctrinal
questions, including freestanding federalism but not limited thereto. For
people who focus on political genealogy and consequences, maybe exposing
the nineteenth- and twentieth-century origins of constitutional statehood
will make modern states-rights advocacy seem more or less normatively ap-
pealing. And for observers who care about the analytical category of “consti-
tutional law,” the evident dynamism of statehood as a “contested truth”
might shift states-rights issues toward the realm of democratic politics, in-
stead of mythologies about timeless principles.293
A. Freestanding Federalism
An important group of “New Federalism” precedents emerged in the
1990s because new conservative justices were appointed to the Supreme
292. E.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118
YALE L.J. 1256 (2009); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE
L.J. 2023 (2008); Judith Resnik, Essay, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the
Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federal-
ism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094 (2014).
293. Of course, it is also possible that reactions to new historical information will not jus-
tify much optimism. For example, different kinds of evidence that are not discussed here might
overwhelm this Article’s narrow legal focus, boosting statehood by describing it as a phenome-
non of extralegal politics, culture, or social history. Furthermore, perhaps myths of statehood
are too big to fail, having become so deeply embedded and politically useful in modern times
that historical truths are ancillary or irrelevant to modern practice. See infra Conclusion.
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Court.294 Such federalism cases were “new” because they restricted federal
authority and boosted states’ power in ways unseen since the 1930s. But they
also echoed decades of legal thought, holding that constitutional federalism:
(a) demands respect for states’ rights as a hardwired eighteenth-century fea-
ture of American law, and (b) confers functional benefits such as accounta-
bility, experimentalism, localism, and liberty that improve American
democracy.295 Those same principles will most likely yield similar results in
the foreseeable future, given the Supreme Court’s latest conservative mem-
bers and decisions.296 Accordingly, even though New Federalism cases are no
longer “new,” they provide an indirect avatar for future generations of ag-
gressive states-rights jurisprudence.
John Manning decried one group of New Federalism cases as “freestand-
ing federalism” because they were “not tied to any particular clause of the
Constitution.”297 In particular, doctrines about anticommandeering and
state sovereign immunity rely on arguments about constitutional purpose
and structure that are separate from the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments’
text.298 Because Manning rejected the Court’s nontextual methodology, he
categorically argued that, applying proper constitutional analysis, “there is
no freestanding federalism” at all.299
A response by Gillian Metzger disputed Manning’s textualism, and that
methodological dispute kept her from fully endorsing his substantive re-
sults.300 Unlike Manning, Metzger was dedicated to using interpretive factors
other than constitutional text—especially constitutional purpose and struc-
ture—unless in particular contexts the Framers and ratifiers “intended” to
294. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Princi-
ple?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213 (1998); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:
Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Com-
ment: Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80
(1995). The crucial moment was in 1991, when Clarence Thomas succeeded Thurgood Mar-
shall, because that appointment is what initiated twenty-five years of “swing vote” status for
Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter
to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005, 1008
(1992) (“Over the next four decades you will cast many historic votes on issues that will pro-
foundly affect the quality of life for our citizens for generations to come.”); Jeffrey S. Rosenthal
& Albert H. Yoon, Judicial Ghostwriting: Authorship on the Supreme Court, 96 CORNELL L.
REV. 1307, 1320–21, 1321 n.66 (2011).
295. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 953, 957 n.8, 961 n.37 (1994); H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional
Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 642 (1993); see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).
296. Ian Samuel, Textualism for Realists, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1085, 1085–86 (2019).
297. Manning, supra note 13, at 2004–05; see also Green, supra note 13, at 662 (discuss-
ing various doctrines regarding constitutional structure that Manning might criticize as simi-
larly “freestanding”).
298. See Manning, supra note 13, at 2030–39. Manning also criticized “clear statement
rules” based on federalism, see id. 2025–29, but those will not be discussed here. See infra note
333 (discussing similar doctrines under the heading “constitutional common law”).
299. Manning, supra note 13, at 2004.
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require pure textualism.301 With respect to states’ rights, Metzger did not
find any such intent, and she suggested that Manning’s strict textualism
could be “destabilizing to existing doctrines and long-established practices of
constitutional interpretation.”302 The evidence in Part II offers new historical
grounds for skepticism about states’ rights without having to confront meth-
odological disputes about constitutional textualism.
Freestanding federalism and other New Federalism decisions have
prominently featured states-first historical theories.303 Any assumption that
states preceded the federal government and compromised small parts of
their intrinsic sovereignty under the Constitution distorts the constitutional
balance in favor of “unenumerated states’ rights.”304 The typical states-first
argument assumes that states possessed—at some indefinite historical mo-
ment—unlimited and unspecified legal prerogatives comparable to interna-
tional forms of governmental sovereignty. Under that assumption, states
arguably retained such primordial authority to the greatest degree possible
unless there is specific eighteenth-century evidence of waiver.305
For example, proponents describe anticommandeering and state sover-
eign immunity as privileges that were stable, established, widely understood,
and traditional elements of eighteenth-century statehood, which hardly any-
one thought it was necessary to describe in explicit language. 306 Almost all of
the Supreme Court’s evidence in upholding these doctrines came from the
Convention and ratification debates, without recognizing statehood’s insta-
bility before and underneath those politically motivated speeches. The Court
concluded that states would never relinquish their dignity without a fight,
and because there was not particular evidence about anticommandeering
and sovereign immunity, those highly contestable prerogatives for eight-
eenth-century states became established constitutional precedent in the
twentieth century.
Even if Manning is wrong about constitutional textualism, evidence
from Part II suggests that his critique of freestanding federalism is substan-
tially correct. Legal negotiations and documents from 1776 to 1788 illustrate
that constitutional text, purpose, and structure were all equally unsupportive
of aggressive assumptions about preconstitutional statehood.307 Anticom-
mandeering and state sovereign immunity were not only absent from the
301. Id. at 100.
302. Id. at 99.
303. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713–15 (1999); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State
Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 752 (2002); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–19 (1997); U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 802–03 (1995) (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1, 9 (1964)); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
304. Manning, supra note 13, at 2005.
305. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 718.
306. Id. at 713–19.
307. See supra Part II.
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original constitutional text, they were also inconsistent with original histori-
cal context. Preconstitutional states never embodied the kind of sovereign,
autonomous, stand-alone entities that are assumed in conventional narra-
tives and precedents. On the contrary, legal words and actions from that era
repeatedly demonstrated that states were interdependent and unstable—
always struggling over legal status, sometimes winning or losing, but never
silently resting on well-established constitutional privileges.
Revising flawed histories also provides new support for Metzger’s view
that “no compromise” emerged from American history or politics to resolve
most details about constitutional statehood.308 Without disputing Manning’s
interpretive methodology, evidence from Part II supports Metzger’s desire
“to recover or reconstruct a historically situated understanding of the [Con-
stitution].”309 The most important eighteenth-century traditions about pre-
constitutional statehood were indeterminacy, interdependence, and instabil-
instability—not specific constitutional judgments about anticommandeering
or state sovereign immunity.310
This Article’s research might resolve similar disputes about New Feder-
alism that are currently fought on methodological grounds rather than sub-
stantive ones.311 Constitutional judgments about statehood may not require
any dramatic choice between original history and modern function. Eight-
eenth-century legal history suggests that “unenumerated states’ rights” have
deserved, in many contexts, the skepticism that Manning and Metzger ap-
plied to freestanding federalism. Unlike “unenumerated rights” for individu-
als or “unenumerated powers” for the federal government,312 a skeptical
framework for preconstitutional statehood—and also for states’ constitu-
tional dignities and privileges—might produce consensus about substantive
results even for legal observers who disagree about interpretive methodolo-
gy.
B. Racial Politics and States-Rights Federalism
Alongside modern revivals of New Federalism by conservative judges,
the twentieth century also witnessed new ideas about states’ rights. State-
centric federalism had a somewhat negative image in the late twentieth cen-
tury, especially concerning national issues of racial injustice and oppression.
308. Metzger, supra note 13, at 101.
309. Id. at 100 (quoting Manning, supra note 13, at 2038).
310. See supra Part II.
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(2003).
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For several decades, the term “states’ rights” had been widely used to resist
school desegregation and oppose antilynching laws.313 Across a longer time
span, arguments for state-centric federalism were used to defend Jim Crow
racism after Reconstruction.314 The idea was that local populations, includ-
ing African-Americans, silently endorsed “traditional race relations” even if
outsiders and the national public found them repellant. For states-rights ad-
vocates in that era, localized “folkways” demanded respect as authentic and
organic expressions of social values.315
Looking further back in time, the Civil War was waged over states’ rights
to secede and support slavery.316 And John Calhoun earlier explained that
“the peculiar domestick institution of the Southern States, and the conse-
quent direction, which that and her soil and climate have given to [their] in-
dustry, has placed them in regard to taxation and appropriations in opposite
relation to the majority of the Union.”317 The first moments to cement con-
nections between states-rights federalism and regional slavery concerned
nineteenth-century technological, agricultural, and imperial developments,
as much of the United States economy became a “cotton kingdom.”318 Any
history of constitutional advocacy would show a long tradition in the United
States of supporting states’ rights and restricting federal power, and a large
fraction of that history is linked to the politics of racial injustice.319
To pick one example, Ronald Reagan had survived almost seven decades
of American history when he spoke at the Neshoba County Fair in 1980.320
The fairground was a half-hour drive from Mt. Zion Methodist, an African-
313. See JOHN MORTON BLUM, YEARS OF DISCORD: AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY,
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American church that was burned in 1964.321 It was a half hour from the
swamp where civil rights activists investigating the arson were killed and left
in a charred station wagon—the FBI called this episode “Mississippi Burn-
ing.”322 Only slightly farther away was a federal courthouse where the killers
were convicted for violating federal law.323
In that very specific context, Reagan chose to end his fairground speech
with a remarkable defense of state sovereignty against federal intervention:
I believe in states’ rights: I believe in people doing as much as they can for
themselves at the community level and at the private level. And I believe
that we’ve distorted the balance . . . by giving powers that were never in-
tended in the Constitution to that federal establishment. And if I do get the
job I’m looking for, I’m going to devote myself to trying to reorder those
priorities and to restore to the states and local communities those functions
which properly belong there.324
Reagan’s reference to states’ rights became national headline news.325
One can only imagine what such words meant for his audience of Mississip-
pi Republicans, or for the many African-American residents of Neshoba
County who did not attend the speech. In 1980, links between states’ rights,
civil rights, and racial justice were obvious and direct.326
Despite the long and dismal history of states-rights rhetoric, at least two
contexts are sometimes viewed as politically neutral occasions for advocating
state-centrist federalism. One is a purely functional view of “New Federal-
ism,” which began under Richard Nixon, flourished under Reagan, and re-
mains important today. The “newness” of New Federalism is self-consciously
321. SETH CAGIN & PHILIP DRAY, WE ARE NOT AFRAID: THE STORY OF GOODMAN,
SCHWERNER, AND CHANEY AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOR MISSISSIPPI 37–39 (1988).
322. JERRY MITCHELL, RACE AGAINST TIME: A REPORTER REOPENS THE UNSOLVED
MURDER CASES OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 396 n.27 (2020).
323. Mississippi Verdict: It May Give a New Face to Justice in the South, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 1967, at 2E.
324. Ronald Reagan, Speech at Neshoba County Fair (Aug. 3, 1980), in MEG JACOBS &
JULIAN E. ZELIZER, CONSERVATIVES IN POWER: THE REAGAN YEARS, 1981–1989, A BRIEF
HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 85, 88 (2011).
325. E.g., Douglas E. Kneeland, Reagan Campaigns at Mississippi Fair: Nominee Tells
Crowd of 10,000 He Is Backing States’ Rights—Attacks Inflation Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
1980, at A11.
326. Even a once-conservative author wrote: “It’s callous, at least, to use the phrase
‘states’ rights’ in any context in Philadelphia [Mississippi]. . . . And it’s obviously true that race
played a role in the G.O.P.’s ascent.” David Brooks, History and Calumny, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2007, at A27 (Nov. 9, 2007) (emphasis added); see generally George Packer, The Fall of Con-
servatism, NEW YORKER, May 26, 2008, at 47, 52 (describing Brooks’s career “mov[ing]
through every important conservative publication—National Review, the Wall Street Journal
editorial page, the Washington Times, the Weekly Standard . . .” as a “young movement jour-
nalist . . .”). For present purposes, the simple point is that state-centric federalism—with
“states’ rights” as its dominant catchword—was understood in a highly racial context during
the 1980s and 1990s, which has made it important for “New Federalism” to assert meaningful
political distance from those parts of its past.
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located within the vague “now” of legal modernity, sharply and intentionally
separated from premodern episodes of racist ugliness.327 One result of ver-
bally separating “New Federalism” from “Old Federalism” is to insulate cur-
rent states-rights arguments from earlier versions that were connected to
white supremacy and racial subordination.
“New Federalism” is not supposed to be your grandfather’s federalism,
nor even that of your older siblings. Alongside Reaganite political theory, the
precipitous growth of law and economics has promoted a rhetorical mod-
ernization of states’ rights that has discarded the ideology’s inglorious past.
Modern scholarship and judicial opinions routinely discuss or espouse ab-
stract institutional arguments for constitutional federalism and states’ rights,
without mentioning the older racial politics that made federalism’s “new-
ness” seem so attractive and important.328 The New Federalist methodology
of emphasizing institutional theory and governmental function will be con-
sidered infra in Section IV.C.
The other safe space for aggressive states’ rights is the Framing Era, with
its reliance on eighteenth-century history. Many Americans have unwaver-
ing affection for the men who drafted and ratified the Constitution.329 No
one is confused about whether they were racist, and of course many of them
claimed to own slaves.330 Nonetheless, such individuals’ contributions to
American law have somehow immunized their ideas from political critiques
that are applied more quickly and forcefully to nineteenth-century politi-
cians like Andrew Jackson or John Calhoun.331 As mentioned supra, the
longstanding practice of American slavery was economically, socially, and
politically monumental during the 1800s as compared to the 1780s. In some
legal circles, there also is a sense that to criticize the Framers—unlike most
historical figures—implies opposition to the Constitution or perhaps the
United States itself.332
327. See TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM (1998).
328. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Daniel A. Farber, Pledging a New Alle-
giance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the New Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133 (2000);
Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law:
The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69, 88–94 (1982).
329. See KLARMAN, supra note 4, at 4–5.
330. Id. at 263–64.
331. For recent evidence about the political stakes of even possibly insulating the Framers
from modern criticism, see the heated exchange about SEAN WILENTZ, NO PROPERTY IN MAN:
SLAVERY AND ANTISLAVERY AT THE NATION’S FOUNDING (2018) in Nicholas Guyatt, How Pro-
slavery Was the Constitution?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jun. 6, 2019), https://www.nybooks.com
/articles/2019/06/06/how-proslavery-was-the-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/VE5V-8G8Q],
and Sean Wilentz, James Oakes & Nicholas Guyatt, ‘No Property in Man’: An Exchange, N.Y.
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332. But see Thurgood Marshall, Commentary, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the
United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987) (expressing the author’s very different
perceptions concerning patriotism and constitutional law).
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All of these political dynamics illustrate potentially serious consequences
of letting states-rights federalism time travel from the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries back to 1787 and 1788. Regardless of whether readers generally
endorse the kind of political legitimation known as “Founders Chic,” it is
crucial to debunk modern efforts to promote states’ rights with undeserved
references to “Founders-Chic Federalism.”
This Article does not claim that legal ideas and doctrines surrounding
states-rights federalism are improper just because they emerged in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. Much less does it claim that all states-rights
decisions should be overruled. The simpler goal is to relocate doctrines of
state-centric federalism in their proper context, so that they can be appreci-
ated or disdained for what they are, instead of being celebrated as Framing-
Era developments that certainly they were not.
C. States’ Rights and Democratic Self-Governance
This Article has drawn a sharp separation between states-rights argu-
ments and Founding-Era history in order to challenge the alchemy that has
transformed abstract ideological principles into new constitutional doctrine.
Too many Americans think that aggressive state-centrism was a solidly fixed
component of the constitutional system from the start, and modern courts
deploy that historical mistake as a reason to enforce states’ rights against
other political actors.333 Many features of constitutional statehood are rela-
tively unchangeable, such as the Electoral College, the requirement of two
senators, and legal protection for state territory.334 Implicit assumptions
about states’ dignity and sovereignty do not belong on that list, and this Sec-
tion suggests that implicit states-rights principles do not deserve judicial en-
forcement.
To be clear, this Article’s last pages are not a good place to debate
whether to overrule individual precedents as a matter of stare decisis.335 In-
stead, the urgent issue is whether the current Supreme Court should extend
states-rights precedents and create new ones. For example, Franchise Tax
Board v. Hyatt increased “freestanding federalism” by overruling established
precedential limits on state sovereign immunity.336 Vastly more trouble-
333. This Article sets aside issues surrounding “constitutional common law,” which has a
potentially complicated status—including the name—as a hybrid derivative from the “Consti-
tution,” “statutes,” “common law,” some combination of the three, or something altogether
different. For a powerful exposition and analysis of constitutional common law, see Henry P.
Monaghan, Foreword, Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975). See also Gillian
E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
479 (2010); Metzger, supra note 13, at 105–07.
334. U.S. CONST. art. I; id. art. II; id. art. IV.
335. See Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Constitutional Structure, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 789
(2018). But cf. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1981 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“In my view, the Court’s typical formulation of the stare decisis standard does not comport
with our judicial duty under Article III . . . .”).
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some, Shelby County v. Holder announced a novel states-rights principle that
facilitated racist voting barriers in high-risk areas.337 The Supreme Court’s
conservative majority seems committed to expanding states-rights federal-
ism in various substantive areas, without requiring specific support from le-
gal precedents or eighteenth-century history. Especially given the dynamic
nature of statehood throughout America’s legal experience, many expan-
sions of states-rights jurisprudence do not seem adequately justified.
First, functional arguments that are used to support states-rights juris-
prudence can be exaggerated and incomplete. Advocates of state-centric fed-
eralism claim that judges should defend the constitutional authority of states
to enhance modern political values such as accountability, experimentalism,
localism, and liberty.338 However, courts have never assumed or possessed
freewheeling authority to make political actors accountable, experimental,
local, or libertarian. That is why courts would never create constitutional
rules to compel campaign disclosures, public record-keeping, bureaucratic
transparency, or other good-government policies.339 Regardless of whether
those doctrines would be useful or harmful, they simply are not mandatory
features of constitutional law.
By contrast, the constitutional category of statehood is a seemingly spe-
cial trigger that makes judges stand up against democracy to save democra-
cy, striking down authoritative actions by political officials and institutions
in pursuit of abstract ideas about governmental structure. Some states-rights
enthusiasts have suggested that Americans require legally powerful state
governments across the board, regardless of whether, in particular contexts,
the national democracy would prefer something different.
The standard list of states-rights values—accountability, experimenta-
tion, localism, and liberty—is only sometimes linked to constitutional state-
hood in practice, depending on whom, where, and when one has in mind.
For example, it seems hard to celebrate political accountability in states that
have historically or currently imposed barriers against racial minorities’ right
to vote.340 Likewise, suggestions that states are experimental laboratories
sound different as applied to states that pursued eugenic sterilization in the
twentieth century.341 Enthusiasm for local authority has been a mixed bless-
337. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
338. E.g., Powell, supra note 295, at 641–42.
339. Cf. Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (“There is no discernible basis for
a constitutional duty to disclose, or for standards governing disclosure of or access to infor-
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ing for racial minorities, feminists, and people of diverse sexual identities,
while the word “liberty” has been similarly controversial for states’ rights
that historically enforced slavery and racial segregation for a very long
time.342
The point is not to imply that states are characteristically retrograde or
pernicious. States have produced widely various mixtures of benefits, costs,
sins, and virtues in different historical contexts—just like other kinds of po-
litical entities. But the fact of radically changing circumstances makes it hard
to understand on functional grounds why courts should invalidate federal
statutes or other political acts in order to defend statehood as a legal abstrac-
tion. County and municipal governments do good and bad things, and so do
international or private entities. However, only states receive constitutional
protection as presumptive instruments of responsible, localist, and beneficial
government. Although states’ rights are frequently defended on functional
grounds, evidence is notably scant about whether and when states have actu-
ally, always, or sometimes achieved the proposed ideals at stake. The point of
legal theory and abstraction is to treat statehood’s virtues as an axiom or pre-
sumption, more than as a provable or contestable fact.
Second, even if expansive states’ rights were indeed essential to preserv-
ing American government, that alone would not be enough to convert politi-
cal necessity into constitutional doctrine. From the 1780s to the present, a
vast bulk of American history shows that the operative value and status of
state governments have dramatically changed over time. There is no easy ba-
sis to compare modern state governments with those of the 1780s, or the
1850s, or the 1920s.343 In general terms, factors that have driven pertinent
changes have included technology, demography, imperialism, economics,
and political theory. All of these represent unpredictable variables whose
management should be presumptively assigned to democratic governance
instead of constitutional adjudication.344 Like many aspects of American life,
the functional significance of states is something that depends on dynamic
political realities, not timeless constitutional principles. The legal status of
states should rise or fall with rhythms of social experience and political insti-
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tutions, not the relative insulation of judicial precedent and constitutional
decisionmaking.
In most contexts, there is no clear reason for courts to intervene and
protect states from ordinary political forces. Democracies routinely make
mistakes, even about important things, without prompting courts to inter-
fere on constitutional grounds. Especially given this Article’s historical evi-
dence, there is no categorical justification for protecting states’ rights by
analogy to individual liberties or equality.345 There also is no reason to think
that democratic political actors systematically fail to appreciate the im-
portance of state governments any more than the importance of municipal
or county governments, nongovernmental wealth, or capitalist labor sys-
tems. This Article’s evidence does not support a special constitutional man-
date for judges to shelter states’ rights based on policy perceptions of
institutional competence, much less does judicial intervention seem con-
sistent with constitutional presumptions in favor of democratic politics and
self-governance.
CONCLUSION
As a scholar of several revolutions, Ernest Renan said that “[f]orgetting,
I would even . . . say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a na-
tion, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger
for [the principle of] nationality.”346 A similar comment could be made
about American statehood, and in both circumstances, the first half about
“forgetting” is certainly correct. Historical amnesia and errors are every-
where, forming indispensable parts of almost everything. This Article has
suggested that legal histories of the American Revolution are incomplete or
incorrect. Yet some observers might characterize even that small act of truth-
telling as some kind of “threat” to American law, “nationality,” or identity.
By contrast, W.E.B. Du Bois in “The Propaganda of History” asserted
that telling historical truths does not necessarily endanger nationality, state-
hood, or anything else.347 Describing the past can change the character of a
nation or state—just as new historical facts can transform readers, citizens,
and authors if they pay attention. Such changes are often useful, in many dif-
ferent contexts, and Du Bois argued that they can be necessary.
This Article’s effort to understand the origins of American statehood
clarifies the historical and current basis for states’ constitutional authority.
On one hand, states were a disputed inheritance from the Revolutionary
War, and certain features of statehood remain indispensable to the modern
constitutional order. On the other hand, some lawyers and judges have mis-
read the eighteenth century, enforcing theories from later generations about
345. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
346. Ernest Renan, What Is a Nation? (1882), reprinted in BECOMING NATIONAL: A
READER 42, 45 (Geoff Eley & Ronald Grigor Suny eds., 1996).
347. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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what states are and what statehood means. This Article seeks to challenge
those theories, at least by placing them in an appropriately postratification
time period. Parallel to Du Bois’s account of national governments, Ameri-
can states have done “frightful wrongs” as well as “great and beautiful
things.”348 The best way to increase states’ constitutional benefits within the
framework of American government is to entrust most of states’ legal char-
acteristics to the imperfect hands of American democracy.
348. DU BOIS, supra note 1.
70 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:1
